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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY,
a Municipal Gorpomtion,
Plaintiff;

-vs.J. B. and R. E. vVALKER, INC.,
a Corporation,

Case No.
7437

Defendant,
~ALT

LAKE COUNTY,
Intervenor.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, a municipal corporation of 1the State
of Utah, during the years of 1906 and 1907, <as part of
the municipal water system, constructed and installed a

1

concrete conduit from the mouth of Big Co1t1tionwood
Canyon, locaJted approximaiely 15 miles, southeast of the
p~aintiff city, to the cHy, for the purpose of •transporting
water from Big Cottonwood Canyon Creek to the municipal area, for use by its inhabitants. The conduit is coniltructed of •concrete and has a measurement, at the 'Points
involved in the present controversy, of approximately
31;2 feet high hy 41j2 feet wide, outside measurements (R.SOO). It has a capacity of 70 cubic feet per se.cond of water.
The conduit so constructed and installed traverses the
SW 111, of the SW 1,-4 of SeCJtion 24, and the N\:V 111, of
the NvV 111, of SeCJtion 25, Twp. 2 South, Range 1 East,
Salt LHke Meridian.
Prior to and during the construction of said conduit,
the plaintiff acquired certain rights of way over
the aforesaid quarter sections. These right •of way granis
are evidenced by plaintiff's exhibits X andY which were
admitted in evidence (R-546). The following is a true
and correet copy of each of said exhibits:

Plaintiff's

E~hib~t

X

BARGAIN AND SALE DEED
M.R.HAYNES
-tiO-

SALT LAKE CITY,
a Municipal Corporation.

Recorded June 19, 1909
at 9:07A.M.
IN BOOK "7-J" of
Deeds, page 558
DATED ............... .
CONS. $50.00
One Witnes:s
Ack'd. Aug. 2, 1907.
CONVEYS: A perpetual right of way for
a water condurt, said R1ight of way consisting of
a strip of land 66 feet wide and 1322 feet long.
The center longitudena.l line of s:aid right of way
begins rut a point. South 89° 55' East 514 feet from
the Northwest corner of Section 25, Township 2
South, Range 1 East, Sa:lt Lake Base and Me6dian, thence along a 10° curve. R. (20' chords) 77
f,eet to P. 'r. of same, thence North 20° 45' 280
feet to P. C. 10° curve R., (20' chords) thence
along s~aid curve 73 fee1t ~to P. R. C. 16° curve L.
(20' chords) thence along sa;id curve 88 feet to
P. '1'. of same, thence North 54° 48' W~est 30 feet,
to P. C. 12° curve H. (20' chords) thence along
s1aid curve ~JO feet to P. T. of same, thence North
oo 48' West 18 feet to P. C. 10° curve L. (20'
chords), thence along said curve 69 feet, toP. T.
of same, thence North 35° 28' West 250 feet, to
P. C. 8° curve R (20' chords) thence alrong s~aid
curve 63 feet <to P. T. of same, thence North 10°
08' \Vesrt 80 £ee1t toP. C. 16° curve L. (20' chords)
thence along said curve 50 feet to P. R. C. 16° R.
(20' chords) thence a~ong said ,curve 84 feet to
P. R. C. 20° L. ( 20' chords) thence along said
curve G2 feet to P. T. of s:ame, th:ence N:orth 44°
44' W es't 8 feet to W esrt line of propei'ty, s'ame
being North 0° 24' \Vest 1173 feet from the Southwest corner of Section 24, Township 2 South,
Range 1 .FJast Salt Dake Base and Meridian.

8.

Plaintiff's Exhibit Y
WARRANTY DEED
UTAH LIGHT AND
RAILROAD C 0 MPANY, a CJorpora.tion
of UTAH (SEAL)
By Joseph F. Smith,
Ptresident,
R. S. Campbell,
Secretary.
-toSALT LAKE CITY, a
municipal coTporation.
Recorded Dec. 26, 1905
at
M.
IN BOOK "7-G" of
Deeds, page s 23-6
DATED ·Sept. 9, 1905
CONS.
Not Witnessed
Ack'd. 0. K.
CONVEYS: Beginning at ,corner No. 1,
which bears Nor1th 40° 7' Wes't 1538.6 feet from
the Southeast corner of Section 23, Township 2
South, RJange 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridi•an, thence South 57° 24' \Ve·st 275 feet, to corner
No. 2, a tpoint in bed of Big Cottonwood Creek,
thence North 32° 36' W es:t 792 fee1t, to corner No.
3, thence North 57° 24' East 275 feet, to corner
No. 4, thence South 32° 36' East 792 fee·t, to the
plac.e of beginning, eontaining 5 acres, more or
less.
Also a right of way and easement for an
rese:rv:oirs dams, ditches, conduiJt.s, pole lines and
the appliances and utiliti:e·s ,conne·eted therewith to
be constructed by the City, wherever these may
be lo·CJate1d now or here after wi•thin }ands, owned
4

by the Utah Light and Railway Company particularly within Sections 23, 26, and 25, Township 2
South, Range 1 gast, Salt Lake Meridian also
'al·l the water rights and power rights in Big
Oottonwood Creek, West of the Ut,ah Power Company's tail race, owned by the Utah Light and
Railway Company, including herein and particularly meaning hereby the Desert Paper Mill,
Wate·r power in said creek, the Granite Paper
Mi~lwater power in said creek and the Butler
Mill wate·r power rthe latter being located right
at rthe mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon, and
t:he two former ahout a mile and ahout 2 miles
respectively below the mouth of said Oanyon, it
being <t:he intention of ffllis agreement that the
Utah Light and Railway Company relinquish and
rerlease all its r~ight in and to the waters. of Big
Cottonwood Creek for power purposes or O'therwise below the power house of the Utah Power
Company near :the mouth of Big Cortt;onwood
Canyon, provided however th1at the dams for
diverting 't11e wwter from the Creek into the City's
proposed conduit shali not he located eas't of the
City's present weir 'and tl1e hottom of the proposed conclui t s!haH not be higher than 28 feet
belrow 'the floor of the UtaJJ. Power Company's
.power house, so that said Utah Light and Railway .can build a reservoir for regulation purposes
o.f not leS'S tiJ.'an one million cubic feet capacity
between the tail race of said power house and
the said weir.
These deeds were executed by the then fee-simple
owners ,of the land over whi~h ·the said rights of way
were granted. The said conduit was put into 'opemtion
·and use in ·the year 1907 (R,;-454) and has been in continuous operation ·and use since said date. This con-

duit conducts a substantial part ·of ·the culinary water
used and consum:ed by the inh'ahi,tants of the city.
The defendant ,corpora:tion was in posses'sion of
I
certain par,ts of the above mentioned and described
quarter sections of land adja.cent tn s1aid CIOnduit at the
time of fh:e commencemen't of ·this ac,tion, and for ·about
two yelars prior thereto, under an arrangement with the
owner thereof not relevant to this controversy. (Defend•ant's Ex. 47, R-826.)
In Augus't 1946 :the defendant commenced the
erection a.nd con!struction of an extensive plant for the
production of sand and gmvel from the land whieh was
in its posses,si'on (R-769). 'This p[ant ,consists of an
elaborate system of elevated conveyors 'and appam:tus
for crushing the raw materia:! and ela.ssifying tlhe same
for use in the commercial production •of concrete and
road base aggregate. The type and extent of the pl'ant
is shown :on numerous ph01tographs introduced in evidenc:e which are a part of ·this record. Reference is made
to plaintiff's exhibits A t·o I (R-149, 150), rand defendant's exhibits 1 (R.-785), 2 (R-781), 19 (R-783) for a
visualization of the defendant's pl1ant. The defendant
began actual operation of i1ts plant some time in the
early summer of 1948, and eontinued the operations to
the date of the commen,cement ·of t:his ~action and during
it•s pendency.
Plaintiff's conduit was in use and opemtion at the
'time the defendant cons'tructed its plant and pJaced the
same in operation. It is manifest from the records that
the present nwner in fee-'simp~e of 'the· land upon which

defendant conducts its operations, acquired title 'to the
lands burdened by the right of way gr1ant1s in favor of
t'he city (Plaintiff',s J1Jxs. X andY, supm.). The defendant has conducted and conducts i'ts operations with full
knowledge of exis'te~ce of s~aid conduit.
Part of defendant's operations consists of removing
sorl, 'Sa.nd and gravel from its deposrts on the hiHs,ides
below plaintiff's conduit. (Pl1aintiff's Exs. A to I, supra;
Exs. J, K, L, M (R~163, 180) ; Ex. V (R-348) ; Defendant's Exs. 23 (R-552), 24 (~556), 25 (R-558), 26 (R560), (R-777, 779), 1 2 19, 'supra). Tlhe removal of
material from the hillside is effected by the use of bulldozers, (R~777), which pus:h the material from places of
naturall deposition to a "grizzly" or "'trap" which is
located a.t a point near ·th:e, e'ast line of Wasatch Boulevard. This material then enters a tunnel constructed
under the surface of Wasatch Boulevard through whieih
is operated a moving belt upon which the material is
conVIeyed through the tunnel to the crusher whi,ch is
located on the hillside immedi'ately west of Was•atch
Boulevard (R-851, 852).
Wasatch Boulevard is a public county road which
was consltructed by 8a'lt Lakte County as a "make work
project" after H1e close of World War I, in the years of
1918 and 1919 (R-704). The road exten1ds alo'llg the
slope of tJJe Wasa.t0h Mountains and was origina:lly
designated as W:as~a~cn-Honneville Highway. It is now
known as Wa.satcJh Boulevard (R-688). As first constrncrted it wa1s nothing more than a dirt roa!d. It wa.s
located on the hHil-side 'below plaintiff's conduit. The
numerous exhibits in this cruse indicate the general
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position and direction of this ro'ad, but ruttenltion is
particular'ly invited to p[aintiff's 1exhibit J, supra, and
defendant'·s exhibit 39 (R-690) and exhibit 47, supra,
for an accurate understanding of the location of this
pu blie road.
In March, 1948, Salt Lake County propo'sed to
improve and develop Wasatch Boulevard from East 33rd
'South Street (R-691), southea:st1e•r'ly to the mouth of
Big Cottonwood Canyon (R-690). This project was
approved by the Utah State Ro,ad Commission and
surveys were immediately ,commenced (R-687, 690). The
improvement intended by the County contemplated a
widening of that part of ·wasatch Boulevard where it
passes through the land o.f which defendant is in possession particularly in the area which defendant was excavating an'd in whieh it also was conducting its processing
ope·rati:ons (Defendant's Ex. 39 R-692). To accomplish
that purpose the County proposed to acquire from the
owner of the land upon which is located defendant's
workings, an addition'al right of way of about 50 feet
in width (R-707). In making the road adjustment it
was and is necMsary for the county to cut into the hillside below plaintiff's conduit, and change the slopes
thereof consistent wilth what is considered safe engineering technique (R-706, 707, 708, 710, 711, 713; Defendant's
Exs. 39, 40 41 ·supra). The County at the time of contemplating these improvements was immediately concerned with 'the safety of plaintiff's conduit which was
located on :the hillside above the parts of the road which
the county intended to improve (R-717).

On April 22, 1949, the plaintiff commenced this
action against defendant, seeking to restrain its operations. Briefly summariz.ed ·the complaint alleges that
defendant's operations as heretofore conducted constitute a serious menace and threat to the safety of
plaintiff's conduit by virtue of the fact that defendant
in removing material from the hillside below the ·conduit,
was also removing support of the conduit to which the
plaintiff was entitled. Plaintiff sought an injunction
against the defendant whic!h would prohibit defendant
from making any fnr 1bher excavations on the moun'tainside be1ow JYlaintiff's conduit and right of way, and a
mandatory injunction requiring defendant to restore
the natural slope of the mountainside by filling in the
excavations already made and otherwise restoring 't.he
natural slope of the mountainside to a condition that
existed prior to the time defendant made such excavations.
The defendant's answer consists of general denials
of the allegations of the complaint, except defendant
admitted paragr'aph 2 of the complaint which contains
an averment that plaintiff's right of way over and across.
Section 25 aforesaid is 66 feet in width, and that said
conduit is located in the center of the right of way.
The court permitted the defendant to submit an
amendment to paragraph 2 of its answer. Thereupon
defendant proposed an amendment whereby it admitted
eUJch and every allegation contained in paragraph 2 of
plaintiff',s complaint, except 'the defendant denied that
the right of wa.y owned and held by plaintiff over and
across Section 25 aforesaid, is 66 feet in width and also
9
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denied that plaintiff's conduit is cons'trurcted and in's'talled along 'the center of said right of way as same
crosses Sections 24 and 25 (R-62). By minute order
dated August 27, 1949, the court authorized defendant
to amend its answer with respect to paragraph 2 'thereof
whereby defendant spedfically denied !flrat plaintiff's
right of way is 66 feet wide over and

a~cros's

said Section

25, hut the 1court refused to allow defendant to file that
part of the defendant's proposed amendmen't whereby
defendant denied tha:t plaintiff's conduit is constructed
and installed along the center of said right of way (R63, 64).
Salt La:ke County, in view of the contemplated
improvements of ·wasatch Boulevard above described,
was permitted by the court tt:o intervene in tlhe action,
by order made, entered and filed on June 14, 1949 (R-147,
148). Thereupon the County filed its complaint and
answer in intervention. The intervenor asked the court
to determine the right, if any, of the plaintiff to have
the mountainsi~de which lie·s within the limits of Hie intervenor's right of way and roadway, remain in its then
present condition, and further, ifflle county prayed for
the court to determine what, if any, artif~cial support
tJhe in'tervenor wou~d be required to provide and estabHsh if the necessary excavation and removal of material
to wilden and improve intervenor's roadway were made.
Couns,el for the intervenor ~actively participa:ted in the
ensuing trial.
10

The trial consumed many days and there were
in'troduced in evidence by all of the parties a great
number of exhibit·s which have been made a part of the
record of trial. The lega!l, geological and engineering
problems involved were, and are complex. The ·trial
court finaHy on September 1, 1949, made, entered and
filed its findings of fact and co:nplusions of law and
judgment (R-65, 82). Because of the difficult and complicated is,sues involved in the a:ction and the assignments of error on this appeal, the appellant believ;es
that the eourt is entitled to have the findings, conclusions, and judgment, presented in this brief, and it therefore sets forth the same with only such abbreviations and
elimina~tions as pertain ·to formal matters. The foUowing
are true copies of the same :

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That plaintiff is, and at all times ·hereinafter
mentioned was, a municipal corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Sta:te of Utah. That
defendant is now, and at aH times hereinafter mentioned
was, a co·rporation organized and existing under the
laws of the S'tate of Utah. That the intervenor, Salt
Lake County, is, and at a:ll times hereinafter mentioned
was, a political subdivision of the State of Utah.
2. That paaintiff, for more ·than fifty years last
past, lras been, and is now, engaged in supplying to its
inhabitants water for ,culinary, domestic, manufacturing,
lawn sprinkling and other beneficial purposes, and owns
and controls the only system for supplying water to its
inhabitants. Tha·t in the years 1906 and 1907, as part of
I
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its water system, the plaintiff constructed and installed
a concrete conduit from the mouth of Big Cottonwood
Canyon, located approximately fifte,en miles south and
ea;st of plaintiff city, to plain'tiff city for the purpose of
bringing the water flowing in the Big Cottonwood
Canyon Creek rto the p1aintiff city for use by its inhabitants, sai'd conduit being 3% feet high by 4lj2 feet wide
outside measurements at the point where defendant has
excavated, as hereinafter found, and carrying 70 cubic
feet per se,cond of water. r:Pha:t said conduit, so constructed and installed, traverses the S. vV. 14 of the S. vV.
14 of Section 24, and the N. Vv. % of the N. vV. 14 of
Section 25, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, in Salt
Lake County, Utah, and is constructed and installed
along the cenler of a right of way GG feet wide, which
right of way is necessary and is pos::;es'sed and owned
and held by plaintiff across the S. vV. % of the S. W.
% of said Section 24 and the N. vV. 14 of the N. W. %
of said Section 25, provided, however, in view of the
fact that defendant ha,s moved to amend paragraph 2
of its answer in order to deny the alleged 66 foot width
of plaintiff's right of wny in said Section 25, and to
reopen the case for the introduction of evidence on said
subje,ct, and the court having granted the above described portion of said motion, this finding may be altered
subsequently by the court as to the width of plaintiff's
right of way in said Section 25 and all matters necessanly pertaining thereto in the li'indings of Fact, Concluiions of Law and Decree entered herein. That the
conduit fnU of water has not added any weight to the

land o0eupied by it; that it is of less weighl than the
material removed for its installation, that the conduit
followed the contour of the hill, crossing the spufis in
trenches and the ravines in shallow treneihes or in fiUs,
that the conduit wa.s ma:de of cement, poured in forms,
that the conduit as constructed is not adequate to 'SUpport
the water pressure from within the conduit without the
support of earthen embankment on its: sides.
3. That in the year 1931 the plaintiff also constructed a conduit from Little Cottonwood Canyon to
the said Big Cot,tonwood conduit. That said Little
Cottonwood conduit connects with said Big Cottonwood
conduit at a point immediately east of the place where
the defendant has made, and is making, excavations, as
hereinafter found. That the water carried in said conduit
below the junction between the said Big Cottonwood and
Little Cottonwood conduits, and at the place where defendant has been and is excavating as hereinafter found,
in the year 1948 comprised fifty-four per cent of the
total water supplied by plaintiff to its inhalbitants.
4. That said right of way across said Section 24
and 25, above referred to, is situated on a slope. That
the surf·ace of said sl·ope, in its natural condition, was
compo·sed of e'ar'th and coar'ser ma:teria:l so integrated and
consolidated, and so covered with grasses, herbs, bushes
and otlher natural growth, as to form a shield to such
erosion and 'subsi dence as would occur from t:he ordinarv
and usual forces of nature, and so long as such surface
dO'Wll the s'lope from said ri~ht of way of the pilaintiff
remained undisturbed and in its natural condition the
same afforded, and would continue to afford, sufficient
support to said right of way.
1

1

13

5. That during the year 1948 the defendant constructed and installed certain machinery and equipment
at the foot of s-aid slope qelow plaintiff's said right of
way for the purpose of taking from said slope the sand
and gravel contained therein. That in 1948 defendant
proceeded to excavate said slope bellow plaintiff's said
right of way and has continued, and does now continue,
to take out an:d haul away great quantities of earth, sand
and grave'l from said slope. 1'hat the operations of the
defendant in removing the earth, sand and gravel have
been so conducted that defendant has left pits, scarps
and openings in the slope below said corrdui t which penetrate a pitCJh of 2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical; that
nearly perpendieu1ar banks have been created and left,
one of which is within GO feet of the plaintiff's conduit;
that such pits, scarps, openings and banks so made by
defondant will, by natural erosion, recede up the slope
toward plaintiff's right of way and conduit and will
remove the protective embankment and the footings supporting plaintiff's conduit and wil1 Icause the said conduit
to be undermined and to break and fall from it's present
position.
6. That it is not possible to foretell the exact time
when suCJh undermining and breaking of said conduit will
take place; 'that the same may occur within a very short
time depending upon the amount of rainfall, the severity
of storms and the forces of nature brougq1t to bear upon
1Jhis particular area. That i't is impossible to be prepared
with the proper preeantions to prevent the undermining
and breaking of said conduit, if snid exeavations of the
14

defendant are permitted to remain and continued excavations are made. That there is imminent danger to said
conduit from the past, present and contemplated gravel
operations of 'the defendant. That the dama~e to plaintiff whi,ch will result should said right of way and conduit
I
be undermined and the support thereto be withdrawn
will be extremely great and will be irreparable, and the
destruction of said conduit will result in a loss to plaintiff and to its inhabitants of a major and extremely vital
source of water supply. That without such 'source of
water supply plaintiff will be unable to furnish water to
a large part of its inhabitants.
7. That in its gravel removing operations the
defendant has removed gravel, top-soil, shrubs, grass and
other vegetation from within the outer 33 feet of the
right of way of the plaintiff to a point within 8 feet of
the ecnter of plaintiff's condl'it and for a distance of
about 94 feet along said conduit to an average depth of
12 inches, thus steepening the slope of the surface of
the right of way and exposing the surface to erosive
elements and rendering the same more readily subject to
erosion and adding to the danger and peril of plaintiff's
conduit.
8. That on the side nearest the Wasatch Boulevard
a berm of tlhe natural, original s'lope for a distance of
8 feet out from tihe ,cen'ter of plaintiff's said conduit i'S
necessary for the safety of said conduit and a berm on
the side near.est the 1Vasatch Boulevard of 33 feet from
the center of plaintiff's conduit is nece·ssary for a right

should not be impaired in any manner by defendant or
intervenor.
9. That defendant's gravel operations and the
plaintiff's said conduit in said Sections 24, and 25 are
both on a deposit of gravel containing some cementation
and a degree of stability and compactness; but, nev,ertheless, the court finds 'that the materials of said gravel
deposit have such lack of stability that a slope of 1lj2
fee't horizontal to 1 foot vertical is required to safely
support said conduit, provided it is protected by its
natural mantle of shrubs, vegetation and rocks, and when
so protected the court finds such slope to be a slope of
safety for 'Said conduit. 'Dhe court further finds that a
denuded slope of 1lj2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical,
that is to say, a slope denuded of its natural mantle of
shrubs, vegetation and rocks, is not a slope of safety
but is one which will endanger plaintiff's said conduit
by increased erosion at ni,ck points on slopes and from
heavy rainfalls on smooth 'slopes.
10. That the operations of the defendant as they
lmve been carried on have already started erosive action
that endangers said conduit. That the natural mantle of
shrubs, vegetation and rocks on the slope below plaintiff's conduit at the area of defendant's workings has
been removed by defendant in its operations and so
defendant has left a slope or slopes denuded of such
natural mantle and therefore more sl1h;ject to the ,erosive
forces. The court finds that there is not enough cementation and compactness in the said gravel deposit -.vhich
defendant is working below plaintiff's conduit to fnrnish
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a slope of safety for said conduit in such denuded conI
dition and to protect said conduit at a slope less than
2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical, and the court finds
that a denuded slope of 2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical
constitutes a slope of safety for said conduit, provided
no penetration is made below the slope of safety for
said conduit as found in this paragraph.
11. 'l'hat intervenor contemplates, and is in the
process of accomplishing, the widening and improving of
a County 'highway known as the ·wasatch Boulevard a~t
the place ·where defendant is taking the sand and gravel
material from said 'slope 'below plaintiff's conduit. That
intervenor has a present right of way for a roadway 60
feet in width and to use such width and to widen said
roadway it w1ll be necessary for intervenor to excavate
and remove part of the slope wl1ic21 lies immediately
easterly of the portion of said rigllt of way now used as
a roadway known as the \Vasatch Boulevard. rlwt iutervenor's riglJt of way is subsequent in title and 1·ig11t to
plaintiff's right of way for its said conduit and any
excavations macle or to be made by inten,enor in said
slope will be subject to plaintiff's right to have its right
of way nnu condnit properly and adequately supported
by said slope. That the contemplated widening and improving of vVasatch Boulevard by intervenor will result
in increased erosion to that portion of the slope above
the excavations made and to be made by intervenor and
below plaintiff's conduit by creating rec,eding nick
points and will contribute to the danger of plaintiff's
conduit and right of way through erosive forces.

12. That to give proper and adequate security to
Plaintiff's right of way for sai d conduit requires a slope
of not less than 1 foot horizontal to 1 foot vertical at
the outer edge of said right of way, which is closer to
Wasatch Boulevard, which said slope, beginning at such
outer edge, is herein designated as the riglht of way slope
as distinguished from the slope which the court has referred to herein as the slope of safety for said conduit.
But such slope of 1 foot horizontal to 1 foot vertical is
hereby found to be a slope of safety for said right of
way only when it is protected ~by a mantle of shrubs and
vegetation after proper dressing to remove protruding
boulders and filling in the holes, swales and other depressions and making a uniform smooth slope.
13. T1hat in al'l insta~ces of the slopes here involved
where the natural surface prote·cting mantle of shrubs,
vegetation and rocks has been or will be removed and
where the pitch of 2 to 1 right of way slope is penetrated
th court finds that to establish slopes of safety they
must be dressed by being made uniform in slope from
top to bottom, by removing protruding rocks and boulders
and by filling in holes, swales and other indentations and
leaving a smooth surface.
14. The court in these findings has distinguished
between a slope of safety for the plaintiff's right of way
and a slope of saf.ety for plaintiff's conduit on said right
of way. The court finds that to maintain a slope of
safety for said right of way such slope shoul:d commence
at the outer edge of said right of way, which outer edge
in the ground is perpendicularly be'low a. point 33 feet on
1
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a horizontal plane out from and at right angles to tihe
center line of plaintiff's ,conduit, and go down the slope
from that point to the point where it intersects the more
gentle slope of the slope of safety for sai d conduit; tlhat
to maintain a slope of safety for said conduit such slope
should commence at a point 2 feet verti0ally above the
outer, upper corner of the conduit, which is the upper
corner closest to the \Vasateh Bouleval'd, sucJh slope to
continue downward until it re~ches said Wasatch Boulevard; that the slope of safety required for srai'd right of
way is steeper in terms of horizontal to vertical measurements, or the degree of slope, than that required for the
slope of safety for said conduit, the two slopes, however,
having their commencement point at different points 'aS
hereinabove indicated, provided, 'however, the court finds
that where the existing slopes below plaintiff's right of
way are not now disturbed by defendant's workings, and
such slopes have a pitch steeper than 2 feet horizontarl
to 1 foot vertical, su0h slopes, witlh their natural mantle
of vegetation and rock as presently existing, are found
by the court to be slopes of safety to plaintiff's conduit
and right of way so far ~s defendant's or intervenor's
responsibility for the safety of said conduit is ~oncerned.
I
That where such steeper than 2 feet to 1 foot slopes on
their downward course from plaintiff's said conduit
meet a less ·steep but uni:form slope below and 'such
steeper slope is uniform and continuous in pitch for a
slope dis'tanee of at least 50 feet between the said point
"X" on Exhibit "A" above the conduit and s1aid gentler
slope, the court finds that a continuation of such steeper
1
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slope at the same pi tcih of said slope existing above said
more gentle slope into and beyond said gentler slope
will provi'de a slope of safety for plaintiff's conduit and
right of way, provided such continued 'slope is dressed
and provided vvith a growth of vegetation comparable
to the vegetation on the slope above of which it is a
continuation.
15. That as applied to defendant's sand and gravel
workings and the intervenor's widening of said ~Wasatch
Boulevard and the material in said slopes that may thereby be removed by defendant and intervenor the court
finds 'that in such removal of material the various slopes
of safety to plaintiff's right of way and conduit will be
as follows:
(a) A slope of 2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical
beginning at the said outer edge, or edge nearest the
vVasa:tch Boulevard, of the plaintiff's right of way, and
extending down to the ~Wasatch Boulevard at a uniform
slope, is a slope of safety for the plaintiff's right of way,
though such slope is denuded of its natural mantle of
shrubs, vegetation and rocks. The material demonstrated
in area A, B, G of Exhibit "A" may be removed.
(b) A slope of 2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical
beginning at a point 2 f<~et vertically above the upper,
outer edge of the conduit and extending downward to tho
\Vasatch Boulevard at a uniform slope is a slope of
sa.fety for said conduit, though snch slope is denuded of
its natural mantle of shrubs, vegetation and rocks, hut
to proteet plaintiff's said right of way defendant and
intervenor may not remove the material and create and

le'ave such 2 to 1 surface slope beyond a point up the
hillside where such 2 to 1 slope will be intersected by a
1 to 1 slope coming down the hillside and beginning at
the outer edge of plaintiff's right of way, such outer
edge being 33 feet out horizontally from the center of
plaintiff's conduit as demonstrated by line B-C on
Exhibit "A", such 1 to 1 slope to be dressed evenly in a
workman like manner and planted to shrubs and vegetation consisting of either sumac, oak or other native
shrubs and trimmed and rounded a~t the top by defendant
or intervenor, whichever removes the material. The
material may be removed so as to leave such 'slopes so
dressed, planted, trimmed and rounded. The material
demonstrated in area G-B-E-F of Exhibit "A" may he
removed, provided the right of way slope B-E is left,
dressed, planted, trimmed and rounded. Nothing in these
findings shall be intended or construed to require the
defendant or intervenor to establish the slope demonstrated by line C-B-X in Exhibit "A" Where such slope
did not exist on the slope January 1, 1949.
(e) A slope of 11;2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical,
beginning at a point 2 feet vertically above the upper,
outer edge of the eonduit and extending downward to the
'Vasatch Boulevard at a uniform slope, is a slope of
safety for said conduit provided such slope is dressed
and is planted with shrubs and vegetation, but the defendant and intervenor may not remove the material and
create and leave such 11;2 to 1 surface slope beyond a
point up the hillside where such 11;2 to 1 slope will be
intersected by a 1 to 1 slope coming down the hillside,
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beginning at the said outer edge of plaintiff's right of
way, as demonstrated by line B-C on Exhibit" A", such
1 to 1 slopes to be dressed evenly in a workmanlike manner and planted to shrubs and vegetation consisting of
either sumac, oak or other native shrubs and trimmed
and rounded a:t the top by the defendant or intervenor,
whichever removes the material. The material demonstrated in area F-E-C-D on Exhibit ''A'' may be removed
provided the slopes left are dres,sed, planted, trimmed
and rounded as aforesaid.
(d) No material may be removed that will leave
slopes steeper than 'that permitted under sub-paragraph
(c) hereof.
16. The slopes of safety and the materials that
defendant or intervenor may remove from the slope
below plaintiff's right of way and conduit as found in
paragraph 15 are shown graphically upon the following
illustrative drawing hereto attached marked Exhibit
"A" and hereby made a part of these findings and the
decree herein entered.
17. \Vhenever in 't'liese findings the court has
referred to the outer edge of plaintiff's right of way as
being 33 feet from the center of plaintiff's conduit such
3:3 feet is to be measured on a horizontal plane at right
angles to and from the center line of said conduit.
18. That the defendant is the owner and in possession o'f the S. \V. 14 of the S. W. 74 of Section 24 and
the N. W. :14 of the N. \V. 14 of Section 25, Township 2
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian in
Salt Lake Colmty and other lands adjacent thereto but

defendant's ownership of said lands is suhject to plaintiff'·s said right of way for its said conduit over said
lands, which said right of way has been a matter of
record in the office of the County Hecorder of Salt Lake
since the year 1D05 as to a part of said right of way and
the year 1909 a,s to the rest of said right of way, which
years are prior to the time when defendant acquired
title to said lands; the ownership of defendant to said
lands is further subject to the intervenor's said right of
way for said Wasatch Boulevard.
19. That the defendant intends to continue taking
the earth, sand and gravel from said hillside below plaintiff's said conduit and such continued operations, unless
restrained within the limits of safety prescribed by the
court, will endanger and imperil pJaintiff's said right
of way and conduit. That plaintiff has not a speedy or
adequate remedy in the due court of law and will suffer
great and irreparable injury and damage unless equity
interposes and grants equitable relief by restraining and
enjoining defendant and intervenor from making excavations in said slopes below plaintiff's said right of
way and conduit except as required and permitted under
the decree of this court to be made herein.
20. The court makes no findings concerning the
right of way on the side of the ·conduit farthest from
the Wasatch Boulevard.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the court now
makes and enters its Conclusion of Law.
I

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Tha:t the defendant and the intervenor cannot
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use their respective land and right of way in such a
manner as to interfere with the plaintiff's right of way
or its said conduit;
2. That the defendant and intervenor cannot use
their respective land and right of way so as to substantially increase the cost of maintenance of the right
of way for the conduit owned by plaintiff;
3. rrhat the gravel operations of the defendant corporation and the proposed improvement to Wasatch
Boulevard, by the intervenor constitute an imminent
danger to the water conduit of the plaintiff;
4. That the court, by injunction, should protect the
plaintiff from erosive dangers set in motion by the defendant and the intervenor;
5. That the defendant and the intervenor cannot
use their respective land and right of way in such a manner as to cause any part of the right of way for the conduit to fall away, subside or be subject to increased
erosion;
6. That the removal of gravel, top-soil and shrubs
in the right of way for the 'COnduit, by the defendant,
constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's rights under the
right of way, and is inconsistent with t:he grant of the
right of way to the plaintiff;
7. That on this deposit of gravel the conduit of the
plaintiff will be endangered hy removal of materials
below it that will result in a slope steeper than the slopes
of safety as defined herein;
8. That the right of way of the Ci'ty will be encroached upon by any slope steeper than a right of way
slope of one to one;

9. That there are numerous methods of protecting
the plaintiff's conduit; by retaining walls, lowering the
conduit, installing a better conduit, placing other types
of footings for said conduit, etc., but no other method,
other than slope protection, is involved in the pleadings
before the court;
10. That the court should make adequate orders
and decrees to insure slope protection to the conduit.
11. The foregoing conclusions of law apply· only
to the side of plaintiff's condu~t nearest to the ·wasatch
Boulevard.
12. 'l'hat tho decree made herein may be subsequently modified by the consideration of other proposed
methods of protecting plaintiff's conduit;
13. The court should retain juri'Sdiction to be
exercised on petition, on notice to be fixed by the court,
for the protection of the said conduit.
That judgment be entered accordingly.
Dated this 1st day of September, 1949.
JUDGMENT
NOvV THEREFORE, upon motion of plaintiff's
said counsel, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that plaintiff have judgment against the
defendant J. B. & R. E. WALKER, INC. and intervenor
Salt Lake County as follows:
1. That the defendant immediately cease and desist
from removing soil or rocks from the surface of plaintiff's right of way as it crosses defendant's land, being
a right of \vay 33 feet \vide on the lower side closer to
\Vasatch Boulevard from the center line of plaintiff's
:-:::. ,
_

Big Cottonwood conduit as constructed upon the land,
said 33 feet to be mea,sured in a horizontal plane at
right angles to the center line of said conduit.
2. That defendant J. B. and R E. Walker, Inc. on
or before October 31, 1949, restore rthe surface of plaintiff's right of way at the place where such surface ha:s
been distrubed by said defendant as found by the court
by filling in earth material and top-soil to an average
depth of 12 inches, and that said defendant, on or before
the 31st day of December, 1949, at such time as weather
and planting conditions are favorable, plant :shrubs consisting of either sumac, oak or other native shrubs in
such numbers as will give a growth of shrubs and brush
of like density as prevails on natural slopes in the
inm1ediate vicinity of such restored area where shrubs
and brush are now growing.
3. That the defendant and the intervenor are, and
each of them is, hereby enjoined and restrained from
moving earth, sand, gravel, rocks or other material from
the slope below plaintiff's said right of way and conduit
as the same crosses Sections 24 and 25 in Township 2
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
which removal will disturb the slope below plaintiff's
said right of way and conduit by increasing the pi trh
of the slope to a steeper uniform slope than a slope
measuring 2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical below said
right of way, beginning at the outer edge of said right
of way and sloping downward to the vVasa tch Boulevard,
which outer edge of said right of way on the ground is
perpendicularly below a point 33 feet on a horizontal

plane out from and at right angles to the center line of
plaintiff's conduit; that defendant J. B. and R. E.
Walker, Inc. be, and it hereby is, ordered and required
to fill in such earth material as shall be required to
create and leave such uniform slope of 2 feet horizontal
to 1 foot vertical from .said outer edge of plaintiff's said
right of way downward to the Wasateh Boulevard, such
work to he completed no later than October 31, 1949.
"1. As an alternative to complying with the require.:.
ments specified in paragraph 3 hereof, the defendant and
intervenor may remove earth, sand, gravel, ro,ck and
other material from said mountain side and create and
leave slopes steeper than one measuring 2 feet horizontal
to 1 foot vertical within the following limitations:
(a) Defendant and intervenor may remove 1the
material so as to leave the slopes described in subparagraph (b) of paragraph 15 of the court's Findings
of Fact subject to the conditions as to dressing, trimming, rounding and planting orf shrubs and vegetation
therein specified; the material removable hereunder being the area shown in the· illustration referred to in
paragraph 1G of the court's Findings marked Exhibit
"A" nnd made a part ofthis clc.cree, .1s tl:e area G-D-E-F.
(b) . Defendant and intervenor may remove ma~erin1
so as to leave the slopes described in sub-paragraph (c)
of paragraph 15 of the court's Findings of Fact, subject
to the conditions as to dressing, trimming, rounding and
planting of shrubs and vegetation therein ::;pecified; the
material removable hereunder being the area .shown in
the illustration referred to. in 1)aragraph 16 of the court--'s

Findings of Fact marked E:rllibit "A" and made a part
of this decree as the area F-E-C-D ; the party removing
any of such material is hereby ordered to trim and round
the top of said slope and dress the slope evenly and
plant shrubs and vegetation, all of which said work must
be done in a workmanlike manner.
(c) It is further decreed that the shrubs required
by any tenns of paragraph 4 of this decree to be planted
shall be such shrubs as sumac, oak or other native shrubs
whi~h shall be planted sufficiently dense to provide a
covering of comparable density to the natural growth
on slopes in the immediate vicinity of defendant's gravel
pit now containing such growth and shall be planted in
such a manner and at such a time ithat they will take
root and grow, such planting to be no less than one year
after beginning the removal of the material in the hillside to the pitch permitted under paragraph 4 of this
decree.
(d) It is further decreed that sufficient top-soil
be replaced upon the slopes required under paragraph
4 of this decree to be planted in shrubs, and vegetation
to provide such shrubs and vegetation with reasonably
good soil, such restoration of top-soil and planting of
shrubs and vegetation being a part O'f the dressing of
slopes required under said paragraph 4 to be dressed.
(e) It is further decreed that no part of the area
illustrated in paragraph 16 of the court's Findings of
Fact shown on Exhibit ''A'' and hereby made a part of
this decree, as the area D-C-E-B-X- Y, shall in any manner be disturbed, and the defendant and intervenor are

hereby enjoined and restrained from in any manner disturbing the same or taking mate-rial of any kind therefrom.
(f) lt is further de.creed rthat all requirements for
I
slopes left steeper than the 2 feet to 1 foot slope provided
for in paragraph 3 of this decree and permitted under
paragraph 4 of this decree shall be· performed and completed within one year from the disturbance of said 2 to
1 slope, or in lieu thereof that a bond guaranteeing said
provisions approved by the court as to form and amount
by filing within said year in a sum no less than$10,000.00.
(g) lt is further orde-red and decreed tha:t nothing
in the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and in this decree shall require the defendant or intervenor to establish the pitch demonstrated by line C-B-X
of Exhibit "A" where ·such pitch did not exist on January 1, 1948.
5. ln addition to the earth materials tha:t defendant may remove as provided elsewhere in this decree,
where the natura1 slopes as they existed on January 1st,
1948, and where they had not been altered by man, existed at a pitch steeper than two feet horizontal to one
foot vertical, and where said slopes with a pit~h srteepe-r
than two to one as aforesaid continue doWnward until
they meet a gentler slope and where a said steeper slope
a:bove said gentler slope has an average uniform and continuous pitch of at least fifty feet between point "X" on
FJxhibit "A" above fhe said conduit and a gentler slope,
the defendant or intervenor is not prohibited from
removing earth materials from t.l1e said gentler slope,
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provided that tJhe area drsturbed is dressed by the party
disturbing the same and provided by said party with a
growth of vegetation comparable to the vegetation on the
slope and above said disturbed area, within one year
from the commeneement of the disturbance of said slope.
Defendant and intervenor are enjoined from creating, in
the removal of the material described in this paragraph
of this decree, a pitch steeper than the said average
pitch of at least flrfty feet down from point "X" above
the conduit in the said area distur'bed.
6. Defendant is granted the rig•ht to amend paragraph 2 of defendant's answer by denying that the right
of way for the plaintiff's conduit in the N. W. :1;.4, of the
N. W. :1;.4, of Section 25, Township 2 South, Range 1 Ea.st,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, is 66 feet in width; and
it is ordered 'that this case may be reopened for the introduction of evidence as to the width of said right of way
in said Seetion 25. This decree is binding upon the
parties hereto in said Sections 24 and 25, but the court
reserves jurisdiction to hear evidence on and determine
the width of the said right of way in said Section 25
and to subsequently alter the provisions of this decree
pursuant to the findings that may be made on the width
of said right of way and the other provisions to be
affected thereby.
7. It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the decree may be subsequently modified by the consideration of other proposed methods of
protecting plaintiff's conduit and right of way and that
the court hereby retains jurisdiction to he exercised by
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petition of either party upon notice to be fixed by the
court, to modify, enlarge or otherwise change the terms
hereof for the protection of plaintiff's said conduit and
right of way.
8. It is further ORDERED that costs are to be
borne by the party incurring the same.
Dated this 1st day of September, 1949.
A half-tone reproduction has been made of the
Exhibit A to which the findings and judgment refer, and
is included in this brief.
On September 6, 1949, defendant served and filed
its motion for a new trial, which was denied by the court
on September 23, 1949.
Upon application of defendant and pursuant to paragraph 6 of the judgment, the court granted defendant'>s
motion to reopen case for the purpose of taking further
evidence. The defenda;nt thereupon served and filed its
supplemental answer under paragraph 6 of the judgment
wherein it prayed that the ,court adjudicate that plaintiff's easement and right of way as the same crosses
Section 25, is of a width of 41!2 feet (R. 105-108). Upon
traverse by plaintiff the said matter :3ame on for hearing,
and on December 10, 1949, the court made, entered and
filed i'ts order and supplemental judgment (R. 119, 120),
adjudicating as follows:
"* * * it is hereby ordered that the defendant
take nothing by supplemental answer and that the
plaintiff owns and holds a right of way across
Section 25, Twp. 2 South, Hange 1 East, Salt
Lake Base and .Meridian, for aforesaid Big Cottonwood conduit of a minimum width of 33 feet
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on each side of the center line of ea:ch conduit,
as constructed, for the proper maintenance, repair, and repla:cement of said conduit; that the
decree of this court as made and entered on
September 1, 1949, shall be and remain in all
respects as made and entered provided that this
order s1mll not preclude further hearings as to
the width of the right of way and easement of
plaintiff across said Section 25, pursuant to the
terms of paragraph 6 o1f the decree herein on
September 1, 1949. ''
The aforesaid supplemental order and judgment was
supported by findings of fact (R. 121-123) reading as
follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That plaintiff is now, and since September 9,
1905 has been, the owner of a right-of-way and easement by virtue of a grant to it by the Utah Light and
Railway Company, a Utah corporation, granting plaintiff the right to construct, maintain and operate reservoirs, dams, ditches, conduits pole lines and the appliances and utilities connected therewith across and over
Section 25, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, which grant was recorded December
26, 1905 in Book 7-G of Deeds, pages 23-G in the office
of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah.
2. That in the years 1906 and 1907 plaintiff constructed a concrete conduit 3% feet high by 4% feet
wide across said Section 25, pursuant to the grant so
made to it, for the purpose of conveying water from the
mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon to plaintiff city for
use by its inhabitants. That said conduit, herein refer-
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red to as Big Cottonwood Conduit, has remained in the
original place where constructed since the time of its
construction.
3. That defendant was, on the date of the commencement of this action, and still is, the owner of the
fee of said Section 25, whereon plaintiff has constructed
its said Big Cottonwood Conduit.
4. That the said grant of easement and right-of-way
does not, by its terms, state the width of any particular
right-of-way granted therein. The court finds that it is
not necessary to dispose of the issues here involved to
determine the exact width of the right-of-way granted by
said Utah Light and Railway Company to plaintiff for
the plaintiff's said Big Cottonwood Conduit. But the
court finds, from the evidence now before it, that plaintiff
requires a minimum right-of-way and easement of 33
feet on each side of the center line of said conduit, as
constructed, for the proper maintenance, repair, and replacement of said conduit.
From the foregoing Findings of I 1'act the court
makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. That plaintiff owns and holds a right-of-way and
easement for the proper maintenance, repair, and replacement of its said Big Cottonwood Conduit having
a minimum width of 33 feet on each side· of the center
line of said conduit as constructed across said Section
25, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian.
2. That defendant is not entitled to have the Find33

ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and decree heretofore
entered herein on September 1, 1949, altered in any
respects as to the width of plaintiff's said right-of-way
across said Section 25 and said decree is binding, without
a:tterations, upon the parties hereto.
3. That plaintiff is entitled to an order to the effect
that d~fendant take nothing by its supplemental answer
and -that the decree of this court, as made and entered
on September 1, 1949, remain unaltered in all respects.
Dated this lOth day of December, 1949.
On September 28, 1949, the defendant relying upon
the provisions of Paragraph 7 of the judgment dated
September 1, 1949, served and filed its motion for an order
for authority to serve and file its application for a supplemental judgment requiring the plaintiff to mark and
stake upon the ground the west boundary line of its right
of way easement as the same extends across Sections 24
and 25 aforesaid, when the width of the right of way
easement across said Section 25 was determined by the
court, and also to require the plaintiff to make certain
cross section surveys over defendant's land below plaintiff's conduit and to file in said court and .cause the field
notes thereof and other proper maps and records of such
surveys (R-95, 96). A copy of defendant's a;pplication
for supplemental judgment was served and filed with
said notice of motion ( R-97 -102). On Octolber 10, 1949,
the court denied defendant's motion.
On December 13, 1949, the defendant and intervenor
served and filed their notice of appeal to the S'upreme
Court, and the defendant deposited with the clerk of the

District Court a cash deposit of $300 in lieu of cost bond.
Thereafter within the time authorized by due and timely
extensions, the record of trial was filed in the Supreme
Court on Aprilll, 1950.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT DATED DECEMBER 10, 1949, IS ERRONEOUS IN ITS ADJUDICATION THAT PLAINTIFF
OWNS AND HOLDS A RIGHT OF WAY ACROSS
SECTION 25, TWP. 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST,
SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, OF A MINIMUM WIDTH OF 33 FEET ON EACH SIDE OF THE
CENTER LINE OF SAID CONDUIT, AS CONSTRUCTED, FOR THE PROPER MAINTENANCE,
REPAIR AND REPLACEMENT OF SAID CONDUIT.
Plaintiff acquired its right of way easement across
and upon the aforesaid Sections 24 and 25 by virtue of
grant deeds from the fee simple owners of the land over
which the easement was granted. 'l_1he deed from Haynes
(Plaintiff's exhibit X) specifically granted to Salt Lake
City
"A perpetual right of way for water conduit,
said right of way consisting of a strip of land 66
feet wide and 1322 feet long. The center longitudinal line of said right of way. (Here follows a
description of the center longitudinal line.)
'l'he width of the right of way over Section 24 under
the Haynes grant is not in dispute in this action as the
deed definitely states the width and length of said right
of way easement. As to Section 25 however a different
situation ·prevails. 'l'he grant deed from the Utah Light
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and Railway Company to Salt Lake City (Plaintiff's
Exhibit Y) differs radically in its legal effect from the
Haynes deed. Excluding immaterial parts of the Railway Company's deed there is dis.covered the following
relevant provision :
''Also a right of way and easement for all
reservoirs, dams, dit·ches, conduits, pole lines and
appliances and utilities connected therewith to be
constructed by the City, wherever these may be
located now or hereafter within lands owned by
the Utah Light and Railway Company particularly
within Sections 23, 26 and 25, Twp. 2 South, Range
1 East, Salt Lake Meridian • • •.''
It will be noted from the a:.bove that the location of
the conduit easement is not definitely specified, and
neither is its width. The grant is in the nature of a
"floating" or "roving" easement. The rule governing
the construction of the grant of such type of easement
is stated as follows:
"The extent of an easement is determinable
by a true ~onstruction of the grant or reservation
by which it is created, aided by any concomitant
circumstances which have a legitimate tendency
to show the intention of the parties. It is improper, however, to refer to the parol negotiations
which preceded or accompanied the execution of
the instrument. Doubtful language in a conveyance granting an easement is construed in favor of
the grantee. If a grant is specific in its terms, it
is decisive of the limits of the easement. If an
easement is not specifically defined, the r'ule is
that the ea.sement need onlv be s·uch as is reason~
ably neccssar·y arnd conven~ent for the purpose for
which it was created. It is also settled that where
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I

1

a grant of an easement is general as to the extent
of the burden to be imposed upon the servient
tenement, an exercise of the .right with the acquiescence and consent of both parties, in a particular course or manner, fixes the right and limits
it to the particular course or manner in which it
has been enjoyed." (Emphasis supplied.) (17
Am. Jur.-Easements, Sec. 97, p. 995.)
"A general reservation, or a grant, of a right
of way, is limited to a use such as is reasonably
necessary and convenient, and as little burdensome to the servient estate as possible for the use
contemplated." (Annotation, 15 LRA (NS) 293
with Citation of Authorities.)
"In case the location and limits of the right of
way are not sufficiently defined in the grant, a
reasonably convenient and suitable way is intended, and the right can not be exercised over
the entire tract." (1 Thompson on Real Property,
Perm. Ed., Sec. 358, p. 578.)
"The grant of a right of way without stating
its width will be held to be a suitable and convenient way, which will be determined by its sufficiency to afford ingress and egress to the ownen
and occupants of tho dominant estate, what is suitable and convenient heing dependent upon the
circumstances of the case. The servient tenement
cannot be bunleued with tho occupancy of a
greater width than is reasonably necessary for
the uses for which the right of way is reserved as
an easement, where no width is defined in the
reservation. If the grant states merely the object
for which the way is granted the dimensions must
be inferred to be such as are reasonably sufficient
for tho accomplishment of that object * * *."
19 Corpus .Juris Sec. 204, p. 968.)
''Having made its selection under its deed,
respondent was bound thereby, and had no right
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to go elsewhere and do any act upon appellant's
land not authorized by him. ·when it went upon
the land described in the deed, and cleared and
prepared its right of way, its grant became fixed
and certain, and it thereafter had no interest or
right whatever in any other part of the premises.
* * * Of course, the respondent must confine its
occupancy to the identical location selected. It is
entitled to the use of that, and nothing more.
* * *" (McCue v. Bellingham Bay VI ater Co., 5
Wash. 156; 31 Pac. 461, 462.)
"The instrument recites that the grantors
'grant, bargain, sell, convey, and confirm unto
the said party of the second part and to his heirs
and assigns, a right of way * * * for a water pire
line over, upon and across the following described
lands. * * *' * * * It is next urged that the deed
is void for uncertainty as to the location of the
right of way. It is true, the exact boundaries are
not described in the deed, except as to the tracts
of land over which the pipe line shall run. * * *
In the ,case at bar the pleadings admit and the
evidence shows that such a selection anrl oc-cupation of a right of way strip took place in 1891. Not
only was the route marked out and selected, 'hut
a ditch was dug upon the strip, with the intention
of using the right of way for the purposes of the
grant. Under the J\fcCne Case, the grant here
therefore became fixed and certain as to location."
(Everett ·water Co. v. Powers, 79 Pac. ("Wash.)
617-620.)
"It will be noticed that the easement granted
by the deeds to plaintiffs and their predecessors
is couched in general terms and is somewhat
ambiguous. ·where an easement in land is granted
in general terms, ·without giving definite location
and description 1o it, so that the pa.rt of land over
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which the right is to be e~:ercised cannot be definitely ascertained, the grantee does not thereby
acquire a right to use the servient estate without
limitation as to the place or n'ode in which the
easement is to be enjoyed. But the location may be
subsequently fixed :by an express agreement of
the parties, or by an implied agreement arising
out of the use of a particular way by the grantee
anrl acquiescence on the part of the grantor, provirled the way is located within the boundaries of
the land over which the right is granted. In other
words, it is a familiar rule that when a right of
way is granted without defined limits, the practical location and use of such way by the grantee
under his deed, acquieced in for a long time by the
grantor, will operate to fix the location, where the
intention is not fairly expressed in the terms of
the grant controlling the future location." (Cullison v. Hotel Seaside, 2G8 Pac. (Oregon) 758-759.)
The determination of the width of the right of way
over Section 25 is of tremendous importance to the defendant and intervenor, because of the fact that the
defendant and intervenor are enjoined and restrained
from removing either sand, gravel, rocks, or other material from the slopes below plaintiff's right of way and
conduit, which removal will disturb the slope below said
plaintiff's right of way and conduit, by increasing the
pitch of the slope to a steeper, uniform slo:pe than a
slope measuring 2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical below
said right of way "beginning at the outer edge of said
right of way and sloping downward to the ·wasatch
Boulevard, which outer edge of said right of way on the
ground is pe.pendicularly below a point of 33 feet on a
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horizontal plane out from and at right angles to the
center line of plaintiff's conduit." (Judgment Paragraph 3). The provisions of the judgment offering defendant and intervenor an alternative plan for compliance with the requirements of Paragmph 3 of the
judgment, are best explained 'by reference to Exhibit A.
of the Judgment and Findings. It will he noticed that
point B on said Exhibit is theoretically placed
33 feet out from the center line of the conduit.
Stated otherwise, the court prescribed the measure of
compliance by defendant and intervenor with its mandates by selecting the western boundary line of the
right of way as one of the crucial points in determining
both the denuded ''slope adequate for right of way''
(Line G to B) ; the two to one denuded '' slo<pe of
safety" (Lines F', E, B) and also the one and one-half
to one slope of safety with mantle (Lines D, C, B). The
legality ·of these directions must rest upon a determination that the plaintiff's right of way over Section 25
extends 33 feet westerly or in the direction of Wasatch
Boulevard from. the center line of the conduit. It is submitted that without such adjudication the beginning
points of the slopes of safety are uncertain.
Assuming that plaintiff is entitled to support, not
only for its conduit, but also for its right of way, it
becomes a matter of importance to fix and determine
the location and dimensions of plaintiff's "roving"
right of way easement conveyed by the Railway Company's deed. -Without this determination being positive
and fixed there is no foundation upon which to base the
4D

slo1pes of safety for the easement. Obviously'" the commencement of a slope of safety for an easement along a
hillside of the nature involved in this action for an
easement 10 feet wide will not be the same as for an
easement 50 feet wide. Exhibit A clearly demonstrates
that if the plaintiff's easement is only 30 feet in width
(i.e. 15 feet on each side of the center line of the conduit)
instead of a width of 66 feet, assumed by the Court, that
th(~ location of point B will be entirely different from
what it would be if it were only 15 feet from the center
line of the conduit. It is because of this situation that
the defendant and intervenor insisted that the court
construe and interpret the grant from the Railway Company. ·without this determination the data indicated on
Exhibit A do not possess any legality. The slopes of
safety may conm1ence at a point many feet beyond where
the right of way extends. Such adjudication would be
clearly imposing upon the owner of the servient estate
a burden not within the purview of the easm:1ent grant.
It would awount to the taking of a land owners property
without compensation. rrhis aspect of the case introduces
the question of "secondary easements." The District
Court of Appeal of California in Smith, et al., v. Rock
Creek Water Corp., et al., 208 Pac. (2d) 705-707, defined
a secondary easement thus:
"The secondary easement is no more than the
right to make repairs and to do such things as are
necessary to the exercise of the right and to do
them only when necessary and in such reasonaible
manner as not to increase the burden needlessly
on the servient estate or to enlarge it bv alteration in the mode of operation. * * * Thd use of
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the easement may not be changed in such manner
as to make it either more or less burdensome to
the servient estate."
This definition of "secondary easement'' finds support
in prior decisions of the Supreme Court of California in
North Fork Wa,ter Compan·y v. Edwards, et al, 54 Pac.
69, and in Joseph v. Ager, 41 Pac. 422. In the Joseph
case the court in discussing an easement to take water
from the land of another said :
"Such an easement does not give its owner
the right to commit a trespass upon the servient
tenement, or to exer.cise the easement after any
manner which happ~ms to suit his pleasure. His
right is measured by the terms of his grant; or,
where the supposed original grant does not appear, hy the prescriptive use. '11 his, however, includes what are called 'secondary easements,' such
as the right to enter upon the servient tenement
and make repairs, and to do such things as are
necessary for the full exercise of the right. But
these secondary easements must 'be exercised only
when necessary, and in such a reasonable manner
as not to needlessly increase the burden upon the
servient tenement.''
The court further quoted from Gale
237:

.O?'t

Easemen.ts, p.

''As every easement is a restriction upon the
right of property of the owner of the servient
tenement, no alteration can be made in the mode
of enjoyment by the owner of the dominant heritage, the effect of which will be to increase such
restriction.''

The authorities thus indicate that "secondary
easements" are of very limited operation. They certainly
cannot include the right to commence the slopes of safety
of a right of way at a point exterior to the boundary
line of the easement grant. If the owner of a right of
way can impose upon the servient tenement the duty to
support the right of way the calculation of the slope of
safety must begin at the 'boundary of the right of way,
and not at a point beyond that 'boundary.
Defendant and intervenor assert that by the refusal
of the court to determine the width of the plaintiff's right
of way easement, and to cause it to be marked on the
ground, invalidated the ruhove designated mandates contained in the judgment. The adjudication of the width
of the right of way over Section 25 was one of the duties
imposed upon the court by this litigation, and without
such adjudication a grievous error was committed.

1. The supplemental order and judgment is not
supported by the supplemental findings of fact dated
December 10, 1949, by which the court spec:fically
refused to determine the exact width of the right of
way granted by Utah Light and Railroad Company
to plaintiff.
The court 'by its supplemental findings of fact (R117, 118) formally refusel to adjudicate the width of
plaintiff's right of way over Section 25. Its refusal is
therefore beyond question. The contention of defendant
and intervenor that it was the duty of the court to construe the grant of the Railway Company for the purpose
of determining the width of the right of way, has been

set forth above. 'The issue was squarely presented to
the court by defendant's application pursuant to Paragraph 6 of the judgment. Defendant filed its supplemental answer wherein it prayed that the court adjudicate that the width of plaintiff's easement and right of
way as same .crossed over Section 25, is 4Yz feet. (R-105108).
In spite of the fact that the court declined to determine the width of this right of way, the supplemental
order and judgment (R-119-120) specifically declares:
"That the plaintiff owns and holds a right of
way across Section 25, etc., for its Big Cottonwood
conduit of a minimum width of 33 feet on each
side of the center line of its conduit as constructed
for the proper maintenance, repair, and replacement of said conduit." (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no findings of fact to support the quoted
portion of the supplemental order and judgment, and
therefore such part of the judgment is clearly erroneous
and should be set aside.

2. The Court's Supplemental Findings of Fact,
dated December 10, 1949, declaring that plaint:ff
requ:res a_ minimum right of way and easement of 33
feet on each side of the center line of its conduit as
constructed for the proper maintenance, repair, and
replaceinent of said conduit does not support the
adjudication in said supplement'al order and judgment thatplaintiff is the owner and holder of such
right of way across said Section 25.

The supplemental judgment declares the plaintiff
is the oumer and, holder of a right of way of 33 feet on
each side of the center line of its conduit. The supplemental finding declares that plaintiff requires a minimum right of way easement of 33 feet on each side of the
center line of its conduit as constructed for the proper
maintenance, etc. The fact that the plaintiff requires
such a right of way is not the equivalent of ownership
of such an casement. Instances may be easily imagined
where the effective use of a right of way easement reqttires it should be wider than the easement actually
owned. ·when the court found that the plaintiff rquires
an easement of a certain width, he did not find that it
owns and holds an easement of a certain width. If Salt
Lake City had acquired an easement only 20 feet in width
by the Railway Company's grant, it might easily be discovered that it requires an easement 40 feet in width, but
such n'ecessity would not increase the width of the easement from 20 feet to 40 feet against the owner of the
servient tenement. The necessities of Salt Lake City can
be met only by acquiring a wider easement. This finding of "requirement" is not the same as the finding of
"ownership." It is manifest that the court by its refusal
to adjudicate the width of the plaintiff's right of way
did not intend that its finding of "requirement" would
be an equivalent of the finding of "ownership." This
conclusion is further emphasized by the proviso of the
supplemental order and judgment which declares '''that
this order shall not preclude further hearings as to the
\vidth of the right of way and easement of the plaintiff

across said Section 25 pursuant to the terms of Paragra!ph 6 of the decree entered herein on September 1,
1949." 'The situation thus presented makes it clear that
on this hasis the adjudication in the supplemental judgment of ownership of a right of wa.y 66 feet wide cannot
be upheld.

II.
THE PART OF FINDING OF FACT 2 WHICH
FINDS THAT PLAINTIFF'S CONDUIT IS CONSTRUCTED AND INSTALLED ALONG THE CENTER OF RIGHT OF WAY 66 FEET WIDE IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. THE LOCATION OF SAID CONDUIT ON SAID RIGHT OF
WAY WAS NOT PROVED AND IS UNKNOWN.
Finding 2 of the findings of fact dated September
1, 1949, specifically declares that the conduit "is constructed and installed along the center of a right of way
66 feet wide, which right of way is necessary and is possessed and owned and held by plaintiff across * • * said
S:ection 24 and said Section 25 • • •.'' The court refused to find on the issue as to the width of the right of
way across Section 25. (See Point I, supra). In view of
this declination by the court in the proceedings which
resulted in the supplemental order and judgment, the
statement in finding 2 that the conduit "is constructed
and installed along the center of a right of way 6G feet
wide" is completely nullified. The city owns a right of
way but its width is not determined. This question may
be posed: "How could the court find that the conduit
is constructed and installed along the center of a rig-ht

of way 66 feet wide, when there is no determination that
the right of way is 66 feet wide, or of any other width f''
With this condition of the record the conclusion is manifest that the finding that the conduit is constructed and
installed abong the center of a 66 foot right of way, is
supported hy no evidence. The fa,ct is that the position of
said conduit on the right of way in Section 2·5 is unknown.
As an example of the type of evidence submitted by
the plaintiff as to the position of the conduit on the right
of way, the following testimony of Charles V. Gardner,
a civil engineer in the employment of the plaintiff's
engineering department, is reproduced:
"Q. I am asking you if you are familiar with the
City Engineering reoords ~
A. Yes sir.
Q. Have you ever observed any survey made of
that conduit after it was constructed and
placed in position~
A. We have the records of this here, the center
line description.
Q. Yes; but was that center line description so
made from field notes, before or after the
,conduit was constructed; that is what I want
to know. I want to lmow where that conduit
is?
A. That is one thing I can't say because I never
made the notes. I was not there at the time
of the construction. I don't know whether
they made the notes at the time they were
constructing it, or just before, but these notes
are tied, as stated, to a certain section point.
Q. Is that 24 or 251
A. 23, 24, 25 and 26, Township 2 South, Range
1 East.
-±7

Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

Where is the right-of-way description tied
in the disputed area; that is what I am interested in 1
It is tied to that certain point.
To what-24 1
23, 24, 25, 26, the corner common to those
sections.
'11 he common corner~
Yes.
?
Do you know, actually, where that common
corner is actually located?
I have never actually located it myself, no.
You say these field notes are based upon a
tie to that common corner 1
That is right.
And it is because it is based on that tie to
the common corner that you draw the deduction that the conduit is in the center of the
right-of-way; is that correct?
That is right.
Is there any evidence in those field notes that
the conduit got off the right-of-way?
None.
At this point I am confining my questions to
this 1
None.
You are unable to state whether or not those
field notes were made before or after the conduit was placed in position 1
No.
'l_lhere is nothing in the record to indicate it?
I don't know of any.
Let me ask you about those field notes. Are
those notes indicative of a survey of the conduit in place, or was it a ~mrvcy of the center
line of the right-of-wayf
Those field notes are the center line of the
conduit.

· _ A.

Do they say that, or .are they talking about
another center, which is the center line in the
Haynes easement ground that we have here.
You have heard of that, have you not~
A. Yes sir.
Q. Do those field notes refer to that description
in there~
A. .Those field notes tie to the center line of the
conduit at certain points. They do not refer
to the right-of-way." (R-202-204).
Reference is also made to the testimony of W. H.
Staker, who worked on the construction of the conduit
trench in 1905 and1906.
"Q. As you proceeded with the trench what kin::l
of information were you given by the engineerf
A. There were engineers on the jo;b all the time,
and, to begin with they gave us stakes, and
showed us the center line, and then stakes that
showed us the depth of cut, and the depth that
needed filling. As we proceeded with the
work, and got as close as we could in our
judgment they would give us new stakes.

• • ••
These stakes that they gave you in the bottom
of the trench, where were 'they placed with
respect to the center of the trench~
A. They gav{) us what we call the hub, a square
. stake, _about two inches square; then when we
got down ~close to. the elevation, they put a
tag (tack) where the center was, and we
would measure from the center to each side,
each particular part of the conduit .
. -Q.. So that pBg gave you the exact center of the
conduit?
A. The center line of the conduit.
Q.

Then you measured out an equal distance to
hoth sides to get your side walls f
A. 'That is right." (R-451-452).

Q.

,.

"Q.

A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

. ,.

(By Mr. Riter) I would like to ask this question in this connection: You spoke about
those stakes in the bottom of the trench. That
was the center line of the trench, not the
center line of the City right-of-way'
I don't know any more. That was the center
line of the trench, as far as we were concerned. I don't know anything about the
other.
You don't know anything about the relationshi!P of the trench itself to the right-of-way
acquired by the City7
No, I would not.
You say you measured an even distance from
the center line stakes that had a tack in them 1
Yes.

• • •

Q.

S:o the measurements were made from the
center of the trench to the outer walls of the
conduitf
A. That is right.
Q. And it was in that area that the forms were
built~

A. That is right.
Q. You don't mean to imply that was the center
line of the right-of-way~
A. I don't know anything about the right-of-way.
I assume they had followed their line in the
first place, the stakes on top when they first
gave them to us, and we followed them
straight clown." ( R-457 -458).
In this connection Plaintiff's Exhibit J (R-151-180)
which is a print taken from the tracing in the vaults of

the city engineer is important (R. 152). A delineation
of the right of way and the location of the conduit thereon is explained by Mr. Gardner in the following colloquy:

"Q. If I make the statement that is why (sic) that
conduit was actually built on the western
edge, the borders of the west~rn boundary
line of the right-of-way, what is your ~nsw~r
to that statement~
· ·
··
A. l\fy answer is that the conduit is built: the
center line of the conduit is on the center line
of the right-of-way.
Q. Is the right-of-way staked?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Then how do you know? Do you know where
the exterior lines of that right-of-way are?
A. From the city engineer's records, we have
proof that follows the center line of the conduit, showing that the right of way ex:tends
thirty-three feet on either side of this center
line of this conduit.
Q. Is that based on field notes, or what?
A. Based on field notes, yes sir. ·
Q. "\Vere those field notes taken after the conduit was placed in position~
A. I don't know." (R-201-202).· .
Attention is invited to the fact that: the right of way
grant under the Hayne's deed (Plaintiff's. Exhibit X)
is definitely fixed with a width of 66 feet. The last quoted
testimony of the witness Gardner shows that he assumed
that the width of the right of way over Section 25 under·
the Railway Company's grant.was also 66 feet. As has
been demonstrated, the Railway Company 1 s grant is that
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of a "roving" easement. Its width has never been determined and the court refused in this case to determine its
width. It was a plain assumption on the part of the
draftsman in the preparation of exhibit J that the right
of way over 'Section 25 was of the same width as over
Section 24. While the field notes may be accurate
in locating the center line of the conduit, they cannot
possibly show the width of the right of way over Section
25, because the grant makes it indefinite. It is proper
therefore to inquire how the placement of the center line
of the ~onduit can determine that the conduit is constructed on the center line of a right of way of uncertain
width 1 'l'he conclusion seems to be inescapable that the
finding that the conduit is constructed and installed along
the center of a right of way 66 feet wide is supported by
no evidence but is based upon the false assumption of
the city engineer that because the right of way was 66
feet in width under the Hayne's grant (Plaintiff's Exhibit X) it is also 66 feet wide under the Railway Company's grant (Plaintiff's Exhi'bit Y).
Addressing ourselves again to Exhibit A, which is a
part of the findings of fact and judgment in this action,
it will ·be seen that as to Section 25 the court placed the
conduit in the theoretical center of the 66 foot right of
way and made its computations and determinations accordingly. Defendant contends that the placement of the
conduit on Exhibit A in the center of a GG foot right of
way is based upon the same error which caused the city
engineer on Exhibit J to ass1.tme that the right of way
over Section 25 was 66 feet in width. Such assumption
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when transferred to Exhibit A, produces erroneous results in the judgment which are highly prejudicial to the
defendant in the adjudication of the slopes of safety.
The condition demonstrates one ef the serious errors
committed in this case, which inflicts most serious damage to defendant in its operations by depriving it of the
right to remove earth material from its land which otherwise it would be entitled to do.

III.
THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPHS 1 AND
2 OF THE JUDGMENT DATED SEPTEMBER 1,
1949, VvHICH PROHIBITS DEFENDANT AND INTERVENOR FROM REMOVING SAND, ROCKS,
GRAVEL, ETC., FROM PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT OF
\VAY, AND REQUIRES DEFENDANT TO RESTORE THE PLACES ON SAID RIGHT OF WAY
FROM WHICH SOIL, ROCKS, GRAVEL, ETC.,
HAVE BEEN REMOVED BY FILLING DECLIVITIES WITH SOIL, ETC., AND REPLANTING WITH
VEGETATION ARE ERRONEOUS.
Paragraph 1 of the judgment dated September 1,
1949, orders defendant immediately to "cease and desist from removing soil or rocks from the surface of
plaintiff's right of way as it crosses defendant's land,
being a right of way 33 feet wide on the lower side closer
to ~Wasatch Boulevard from the center line of plaintiff's
Big Cottonwood conduit as constructed upon the land,
said 33 feet to be measured in a horizontal plane at right
angles to the center line of said conduit." By Paragraph
2 the defendant is directed to ''restore the surface of
plaintiff's right of way at the 1place where such surface
has been disturbed ·by said defendants '*' * * by filling
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in earth material and top soil to an average depth of 12
inches, and that said defendant on or before the 31st day
of December, 1949, at such times as weather and planting conditions are favorable, plant shrubs '"' '"' '"'.''
According to the plaintiff's evidence soil material
was removed from an area of about 94 feet laterally
along the conduit commencing about 8 feet from the conduit and extending down the slope of a distance of about
60 feet (R... 312l, 491, 492).

J. B. Walker, the president of defendant company,
testified a.s follows:
''A. There are exhibits here that show that area
very fully, and the only thing that happened
at that area, it represents where the bulldozer would be hacked up, and a bulldozer
is about twenty feet long, with a blade on it;
and what disturbance is shown there is merely
what would occur with the cleats of the bulldozer digging down into ·the ground.
Q. How much of a declivity did the bulldozer
make at that point?
A. It would be very, very small, and inconsequential.
Q. In how wide an area?
A. There is an area there where they backed up
for about-that is, 1paralleling the conduit,
there is an area there of about ninety feet in
length, paralleling the conduit.
Q. Did you take any earth, remove any earth
therefrom1
A. No, not in that area. It was merely what
would be churned up with the bulldozer
cleats.
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Q.

A.

Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

·was the bulldozer placed so it could remove
earth at that poinH
No. The blade was down-hill. The removal
of earth, as shown by our cross section,
started approximately sixty feet from that
point.
So, when the bulldozer entered that area, did
you see it working there~
Y.es, I was there all the time.
Did you know the extent of the right-of-way
at that time 1
No.
Did you remove any earth from the right-ofway within that thirty-three foot limit?
No, I would say not. The area, as I said,
shows the marks of the bulldozer treads going up there, and any earth that would be
removed would be what would be kicked
loose as a result of backing the machine up
there.
In other words, you did not put the bulldozer
up there for the purpose of removing the
earth 1
No, because you could not hold a bulldozer
on a plane parallel with the conduit, on that
slope. The slope was too stee,p, and it would
be very dangerous to attempt to use a bulldozer to scrape in the mannerwhich you imply. It could not be done.
·what is your testimony with respect to the
removal of earth from the .city's easement?
Except as I have noted, there has been none
removed there. There is, of course, this question as to where their right-of-way begins and
ends, >because of tl.J.e'"' ~ ..

Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.

A.

Q.
A.

Q.

A.

Q.
A.

(By Mr. Riter) In other words, to state it
properly, the easement, the right-of-way easement is not marked on the ground 1
No, it is uot.
Where does your .excavating and removal of
the soil commen.ce with respect to the center
line of the conduitf
I would say that that first evidence of any
degree of removal is forty feet down the
slope. That is a:bout where the blade would
start picking up.
(By the Court) That is forty feet from the
center line of the conduit 1
That would be my estimate. I have never
measured it.
That is where your series of operations commencedf
No, our operations commenced approximately
sixty or sixty-five feet from there.
From the center line of the conduit?
Yes. Our cross sections also show it on Exhibits 24, 25 and 26.
How much soil do you think has been removed between the forty foot limit and the
sixty or sixty-five foot limit 1
I would like to have the question again.
(Question read.)
How much soil has been removed between a
point forty feet from the center line of the
conduit and sixty feet from the center line of
the conduiH
But very little, ~possibly-oh, over the whole
area possibly an average of five or six inches
to a foot. That is, you mean forty feet out 1
Yes.
And from there to the sixty foot point where
we started production.
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Yes.
That ''muld be a'bout right.
Q. How much earth has been removed, if any,
within the area extending forty feet from the
center line of the conduit~
THE COURT: Extending forty feet to
where1
l\IR. RITER: Extending from the center
line of the conduit to a line forty feet therefron.1.
A. ']'hat would be pretty hard to state. I will
attempt to compute it for you.
THE COUHT: I think maybe I don't understand it. Do you mean right next to the conduit1
MR IU'f EH : Yes.
THE \vTfN ESS: Over what area'?
Q. (By 1\Ir. Riter) Over the extent of your active opening workings at that point in the
gravel pit.
'fHE COURT: Mr. \Valker, you testified
you have not removed any soil closer than forty
feet1
A. I said that the only thing that was done in
that area, Judge, was what would be torn up
or churned up by backing the caterpillar up
on it.
}.Ill. RITER: That is what I wanted.
Q. (Continued) 'l'he only amount that would
be removrd 1vould be under the backing of
the cat. up successively, which was not too extensive, because there were not many passes
made in a given spot.
In other words, take an area twelve feet
wide, the cat. poHsibly would back up over
a ~place--the blade on a cat. is only that wide.
'rhe amount of dirt that would be removed would be the amount that would be
churned 11p by the cat. backing up. Some of
Q.

A.
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that might be loose and fall down a little
farther, 'but that is all that would be involved
there; and the amount would be very, very
hard to state." (R-777-780).
The Court's mandate in connection with the alleged
soil removal from plaintiff's right of way shows the
error in the refusal of the court to adjudicate the width
of the right of way over Section 25. (This disturbance
of the surface soil occurred entirely in Section 25, and
not in Section 24). The provisions of the juclg1nent
above quoted assume that the conduit is in the center
of the right of way and that the width of the right of
way is 66 feet. It is believed that it has been demonstrated herein that until the court determine;, the width
of the right of way over Section 25 it is not in a position to reach any conclusion as to whether defendant
had removed any soil material from the right of way.
On this hasis alone the wbove quoted parts of the judgment have no legal foundation. The fact that the defendant may have removed a small amount of soil at a
point commencing 8 feet from the conduit is not proof
that it removed soil from plaintiff's right of way because there is no proof as to the limits and boundary
of said right of way on the westerly side thereof.

1. Defendant owned the soil, rocks, gravel, etc.,
on said right of way, and had the right to remove
same if by such removal it did not impair the safety
of plaintiff's conduit.
If it be assumed that plaintiff's right of way extended in a we:!terly direction of 33 feet from the center

line of the conduit, the quoted parts of the judgment fail
to recognize defendant's legal rights in connection with
this right of way easement. Plaintiff's right of way
grant constitutes an easement only and is not a grant in
fee. (Hayward v. Mason, 104 Pac. (Wash.) 139; Peop!e
ex rel Bryan' v. S:eele, 124 NYS 711, 713). Fur~her, t:he
said right of way was not an exclusive easement. (2
Thompson Real Prop. (Perm. Ed.) Sec .. 578; Pasadena
v. California Michigan Land and Water Co., 17 Cal. (2d)
616, 110 Pac. (2d) 983.) An exclusive easement is an unusual interest in land; it has been said to amount almost
to a conveyance of the fee. No intention to convey such
a complete interest can be imputed to the owner of the
servient tenement in the absence of a clear indication
of such intention. The Railway Company's deed (Plaintiff's Exhibit Y) is simply an easement grant non-exclusive in nature.
Since it is clear that plaintiff owns only an easement
across defendant's land, the correlative rights of defendant and plaintiff become important. The following quotation from Pasadena v. California Michigarn Land and
Water Company, supra, is relevant:
""Where the easement is founded upon a
grant, as here, only those interests expressed in
the grant and those necessarily incident thereto
pass from the owner of the fee. The general rule
is clearly esta'blished that, despite the granting of
an easement, the owner of the servient tenement
may make any use of tl1e land that does not interfere unreasonably with the easement. * * * It is
not necessary for him to make any reservation to
protect his interests in the land, for what he does
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not convey, he still retains. • • • Furthermore,
since he retains the right to use the land reasonably himself, he retains also the power to transfer these rights to third persons. • • • Thus,
in the instant case, the right of the defendant to
use the particular land in controversy is derived
from the owner of the servient tenements, and
whether it is a permissible use is to be determined
by whether the owner of the servient tenements
could have used the land in that manner. ·whether
a particular use of the land by the servient owner,
or by someone acting with his authorization, is
an unreasonable interference is a question of fact
for the jury." (p. 1191-1192).
The Supreme Court of Utah in Nielson v. Sandberg,
141 Pac. (2d) 696, 701, said:

"A right of way founded urpon a deed or
grant is limited to the uses, and the extent thereof as fixed by the grant or deed.''
The Railway Company's deed (Plaintiff's Exhibit Y)
grants a right of way for "reservoirs, dams, ditches,
conduits, pole lines, and appliances and utilities connected therewith," and therefore the uses and extent
of such easement is fixed for the purposes stated. By this
grant the Railway Company did not part ·with the ownership of its land and the defendant as mesne grantee of
the Railway Company stands in the same position as the
Railway Company. The following quotation from Big
Cottonwood Tanne.r Ditch Co. v. Moyle, et al, 109 Utah
213, (174 Pac. (2d) 148) is pertinent:
"The rights of the dominant owner are
limited by the rights of the servient owner.
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Pioneer Irrigation District v. Smith, 48 Idaho 734,
285 Pac. 474. Each owner must exercise his right
so as not unreasonably to interfere with the other
* • "' In Jenkins v. Depoyster, 299 Ky. 500, 186
S.\V. (2d) 14, 15, the oourt speaking of the
easement the mineral rights owner had over ~he
surface said:
'' 'The owners must have due regard for
each other and should exercise that degree of
care and use which a just consideration for
the rights of the other demands. It is elementary that the 1~e of an easement rnust be
as reasonable and as little burdensome to
the servient estate as the nature of the easement and its purpose will >permit.' " (Emphasis supplied).
'l~he

Utah Supreme Court had previously announced
these views in the case of Stevens, et al, v. Bird, 81 Utah
355, 18 Pac. (2d) 292. There the plaintiffs owned certnjn
premises with a right of way 17 feet in width made appurtenant thereto Ly grant. 'rhe fee title to this strip of
land was in the defendant, who used such strip for solely
as a driveway for ingress and egress to and from other
property 0\\11ed by it. Plaintiffs sought to limit and
restrict defendm1t in its use of such drive>vay. They
contended that by a conveyanee to their predeeessor in
interest the grantor created an exclusive easement for
the use and benefit of the premises uow owned by plaintiffs, and one other parcel now owned by defendant; that
the grantor retained nothing but the naked fee, and that
therefore th@ way may not be used in connection with
any property other than the two parcels to which it was
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thus made appurtenant. The deed in question conveyed
two parcels of land together with perpetual righ_t of way
for use and benefit of described tracts of land over 17
foot strip between two parcels. The lower court held for
the defendant, and plaintiffs appealed. Judgment was
affirmed. The Court said:
"In construing instruments creating easements in land, the court will look to the circumstances attending the transaction, the situation of
the parties, the state of the thing granted, aizd
the object to be attained, to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the parties. Here the
words 'together with a per,petual right of way for
use and benefit of above described tracts of land'
designate the property to which the way was made
appurtenant and limit the grantees' use of such
way to the granted premises, but import no limitation upon the right of the grantor to make any
use of the property not inconsistent with the
special use for \Vhich the easement was gl·anteJ.
He (the owner of the servient estate) mav himself ~~.se the way, or permit others to do so, sldJject to the limitation tlwt his WJe or the 1tse of his
permitee 'l'n-ust not be such as to impair- the enjoy'!'nent of the easement by the owner of the dominant estate, or subject him to extra c:J'pcnse in
keeping it in repair, and it is not n'ecesscw?J tlwt
lie expressly reserve any such r'i[Jht . . , cmmphasis
supplied).
Corpus Juris Secundmn, in fliscussing tht> rights of
the owner of the servient estate, indicates tlw.t unless he
expressly agrees to the contrary, the owner of the
servient estate may n~e his pror)erty in any manner and
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for any purpose consistent with the enjoyment of the
easement. The rule above applies to a right of way.
'Vithout expressly reserving the right, the grantor may
himself use the way, or permit others to do so, unless the
rights of the owner of the easement are exclusive, and
subject to the easement, he may also utilize the space
a;bove or beneath the surface of the way. (28 CJS Page
770, Sec. 91).
The owner of the fee can excavate below the surface
of the way if thereby he does not interfere with the easement owners' right of passage. (Kendall v. Ha.rdy, 94 N.
·E. 254, 208 Mass. 20).
Similarly, it is held that the acquisition by a municipal corporation of an easement in a way for the construction of a water conduit, many feet below the surface,
to be composed of the most durable material does not
deprive the fee owner of the right to construct the sewer
above it. (Perley v. Cambridge, 220 Mass. 507, 108 N.E.
494, LRA, 1915 E, 432).
Accordingly, where there was granted to the plaintiff a right to use a forty-foot road, it was held that he
coul<l not maintain an action in respect to a portico which
projected two feet into the carriage way, but left ample
space for the convenient enjoyment by the plaintiff of the
way. The question is, can the right of way be substantially exercised as conveniently as before. (Gale on Easements, page 343, citing H~ttton v. Hamboro, 1860 Surrey
Summer Assizes, 175 Eng. Reports 1031, 2 F & F, 218).
The O\vner of land could not be enjoined from plowing in customary manner across pipe line right of way,

although it might result in unintentional damage to pipe,
where the deed reserved pipe line and right of way.
(West Coast Power Co. v. Buttram, 54 Idaho 318, 31 Pac.
(2d) 687).
"It is well settled as a general proposition,
that the owner of the servient estate, may use his
'Property in any manner and for any purpose consistent with the employment of the easement."
(Hoyt v. Hart, 149 Cal. 722, 87 Pac. 5G9, 571.)
"The rule is that every inciclen t of ownership not inconsistent with the easement and the
enjoyment of the same, is reserved to the grantor." (Diers sen v. ~r c.Connac\:, et al, 28 Cnl. App.
(2d) 16-1, 82 Pac. (2d) 212, 216.)
"It is elemen tnry that the use of an en semen t
must be as reasonable and as little burdensome
to the servieut estate as the rwture of the easement and the object of it will permit. * * * In this
case, the la11<lowners, had a perfect right to use
the strip sought to 'be conclemlled in any way they
saw fit, including the use of them for the removal
of coal and timber from the remaining lands, in
so far as such use did not interfere with the
reasonable exercise or enjoyment of the easement
herein sought to be acquired." (Ky. etc. Power
Co. v. Elkhorn City Land Co., 212 Ky. 62-1, 279
SvV 1082.)
"In the instant case the appellee has the exclusive possession of the strip of land taken for
all purposes necessary to carry into effect an(1
maintain the tnmsmission line and to no other
exteilt. Therefore tlw appellant still and docs
have the right to enter upon the same at all
reasonable times and for all reasonable purposes
not inconsistent, or in intHfcrence, with the rights
of the H'l:pelhe. Appellnut may ccmtjmw to gnnv

his peach trees, cultivate them, and gather the
fruit, so long as he does not interfere with the
property of the appellee or its employees in the
performance of their legitimate duties." (Patter.
son Orchard Co. v. Southwest Arkansas Utilities
Corp., 179 Ark. 1029, 18 SW (2d) 1028, 65 ALR
1446.)'
"Thus, except for the reservations made in
the grant, the owner had the same complete
dominion and control over this 20 foot strip as he
had over the remainder of his property." (Lang.
azo v. San Joaquin Light & Power Company, 90
Pac. (2d) (DCA, Cal.), 825.)
The case of Green Mountain Cemetery Company's
Appeal, 1 Pa. Cs. 371, 4 Atl. 528, supports the rirrht o-~'
the owner of a servient tenement to remove sand and
gravel from an easement. See also: Vandalia E. Co. v
Clay Co·un,ty Rome, 181 Ind. 704, 103 N.E. 1071 and
Va,ndalia R. Co. v. Wheeler, 181 Ind. 424, 108 N.E. 1069.
The evidence in this action shows that defendant's
land is primarily valuable for the purpose of the production of sand and gravel for commercial use. Defendant's entire operations involved in this action pertain
to the excavation and processing of earth material to
produce sand, grav·el and concrete and road base aggregate. The foregoing authorities support the proposition
that defendant had the right to use the land within the
right of way for any purpose in so far as its use thereof
did not imperil the safety of the conduit in place. The
easement grant is for the purpose of the construction
and operation of a water conduit and the duty owed by
defendant to plaintiff was to take no action which wou1d
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impair this easement grant. Defendant did not part with
title to the soil within the easement. It remained the
property of defendant. The court by its mandate prohibits the defendant from using its land for its most
valuable purpose. The court's order virtually converts
an easement into a fee simple grant without compensating defendant for the differenoes in value between value
of the easement and the value of the fee simple ownership. 'The provisions of the judgment under discussion
are entirely too 'broad when they attempt to forbid defendant from excavating on its own land and in requiring it to fill its excavations when made. The utmost
thrust of the court's power is to prohibit defendant from
doing any act which would threaten the safety of the
conduit.
"The Court may properly take into consideration the extent to which the use of the respective properties will be affected by the issuance
or r·efusal of the injunction. If the usc of plaintiff's p:roperty is not prevented, lmt only render·ed
slightly less vaht~able, while the injunction would
prevent the defenda·nf fr·om 1tsing his property
for its only valuable p-urpose, the court should
deny the injurn.ction." (~fcClintock on Equity, Sec.
140) (Emphasis supplied).
In speaking of mandatory injunctions, Pomeroy declares the balance of injury should be considered when
a mandatory injunction is sought. (5 Pomeroy's Equity
.Jurisprudence, Sec. 1966, Page 4468, Citing Hall v. Road,
40 Mich. 46, 26 Am. Rep. 528).
This general principle was followed in the case of
Winters v. T'tt'tner, (74 Utah 222, 278 Pac. 816). In that
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case, defendant's cattle trespassed on the plaintiff's land.
Speaking of injunction restraining the defendant, the
Court said:
"But an injunction is a purely equitable
remedy and ought not to be issued except in aid
of equity."
The facts showed that 1plaintiff's land was in and among
public lands, that plaintiff's land was unfenc,ed; and if an
injunction issued it would restrain the defendant in effect, from using the public lands. The court in denying
the injunction said:
''The oompa.rative convenience or inconvenience of the parties from granting or withholding
an injunction sought should be considered, and
none should be granted if it would operate oppressively, or inequitably or contra.ry to the real justice of the oase."
This principle is also stated by the Supreme Court
of Utah in the case of Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First
National Building Company, 89 Ut. 456, 57 Pac. (2d)
1099, where it was held that even though there is no
laches and clear case~ of trespass, as by an encroachment
of adjoining landowner's building, court will always consider equities between parties, ~and under some circumstances will balwnce 'convenience
and itnj-wries and deny
I
mandatory injurnction, if causing great injury t1o adjoin,.
ing land1owner with little or no benefit to plaintiff.

2. There is no evidence in the record that such
removal by defendant of soil, etc., did imperil the
safety of said conduit.
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There has been quoted above the testimony of both
the defendant and plaintiff which is relevant to the provisions of the judgment now being questioned. It is submitted that this evidence fails to disclose any immediate
or present threat to the safety of the conduit. The explantation given by Mr. ·walker as to what occurred
within the alleged and uncertain boundaries of the right
of way stands undisputed. It is apparent that the disturbance to the surface soil was hut a temporary occurrence arising out of the preliminary operations for excavating soil material lower down on the slope toward
vVasatch Boulevard. J\Ir. \Valker states definitely that no
soil was removed within the, 33 feet which tlw court erroneously assumed was in the right of ·way. 'l'he soil removal occurred 60 feet from the center of the conduit on
a 90 foot front. The indentations and marks within the
33 foot limit were those of the bulldm:er. However, if
it be assumed that soil material was removed wi,tl!in the
33 foot limit, the following testimony of Mr. \Valker is
highly illuminating:

"Q.

A.

Q.
A..

(By Mr. Riter) 'l'he City alleges, in Paragraph 7 of its complaint, that you removed
4480.9 cubic yards of material which would require replacement in that area descriLed as
being the genei·al area involved in this action.
Have you made a computation, and are you
able to testify as to that yardage'?
Yes sir.
Ho\v much is it, according to your computation and opiuion 'I
Assuming that there was eig:!J teen inclws OV('l'
the ar<•a of t1Jeir ri!';ht-of-wny, ~lfter deductf58

ing the eight feet which they claim has not
been disturbed, whieh would leave an area
of twenty-three feet to their right-of-way, by
approximately eighty feet in length, paralleling their conduit-now, if you assume that
material was all deposited uniformly around
the conduit, which is on a curve at that point,
so that eighteen inches were taken off, there
would he approximately one hundred two
cubic yards involved in that area.
Q. Not forty-four hundred 1
A.. No.
Q. (By the Court) Eighteen inches deep over
a length of eighty feet long, and what else T
A. Twenty-three f·eet wide. I can check tha:t in
a minute.
(Computation by witness.)
A. (Continued) There are 1840 square feet,
and the ma,terial is a foot and a half for 2760
cubic feet-that would be 102.22 .cubic yards.
Q. 102.22 cubic yards 1
A. Yes sir." (R. 67.)
This disturbance was of minor and temporary nature
which is entirely over-emphasized by the provisions of
the judgment which should be entirely eliminated or else
radically modified. As they now stand defendant is
deprived of use of property which it owns. As heretofore
stated, these provisions found their way into the judgment because of the erroneous assumption as to the width
oi the right of way.

IV.
THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE
JUDGMENT DATED SEPTEMBER 1, 1949, ARE
ERRONEOUS AND NOT CONSISTENT WITH
.-FINDING 14 WHICH PURPORTS TO SUPPORT
SAID PROVISION OF SAID JUDGMENT.
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The plaintiff's testimony shows that the conduit was
constructed in a trench which follocvved the contour of the
hillside through Sections 24 and 25. (R-451, 455). The
trench was dug by hand labor (R-451) and teams and
scra!pers (R-456). In excavating it the dirt was thrown
on the lower ·side, that is, on the side nearest \Vasatch
Boulevard. vVhen the trench was back-filled, soil from
the east side of the trench was used (R 45G). From this
evidence it is clear that the slopes immediately below the
conduit, at the time of'trial, vvere not natural slopes, as
they had 15een changed and altered by the spill :of soil
from the conduit trench. :Slopes in their "natural" condition must mean slopes which came into being as a result
of the for.ces ofnature, and not slopes which existed after
they had been disturbed by the hand of man. This disturbanc•e would be r_epresented hy either removing soil
fr•om the position in wl:lich it had been deposited by
nature or by
covering the natnral depcisitrons
of soil
.
with overburden such as was done in constructing the
conduit trench. 'I'her:e ean be no question but what the
natural slopes. immedi_ately adjoining the C'Onduit on the
West toward ·wasatch Boulevard as it crossed Sections
24 a~Cl 25, had been changed by deposition of soil removed from the conduit trench. The evidence does not
clearly i~diCate how far from the \~est ~ide of the conduit
this additronal soil deposition occurred, although Mr.
Staker in his testimony makes it clear that it was substantial:

"Q.

(By Mr. Allen) Mr. Staker you testified that
you worlmd along 4 or 5 miles of the conduit
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A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.

A.

beginning at a point where water enters it
now?
That is right.
Going north and wesU
Yes.
You say that the trench along part of that
area was rather de,ep 1
It was.
How deep would you say it was at the deepest
point in any section along there 7
I would s·ay, just off hand, that it must have
been at least 12 or 15 feet because the accumulation as we threw it over would get so high
we had to have a man on the bank to get the
dirt and he would shove it over the bank.''
R. 458, 459).

·we may therefore conclude that the slopes immediately
adjoining the -conduit on the west have been altered by
the hand of man, and that such alteration existed all
through the years since the conduit was constructed,
and also existed at the time of the trial of this a.ction.

1. The provisions of Paragraph 5 of sa!d judgment is based upon "the natural slopes as they existed on January 1, 1948, and where they "had not
been altered by man," as opposed to the provision
of said finding wh£ch is based upon "such slopes,
with their natural mantle of vegetation and rock as
presently existing."
p,aragraph 5 of the judgment recites:
''In addi·tion to the earth materials that defendant may remove as provided elsewhere in this
decree, where the natural slopes as they existed on
J·anuary 1st, 19,!8, and where they had not been
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altered by man, existed at a pitch steeper than
two feet horizontal to one foot vertical, and where
said slopes with a pitch steeper than two to one as
aforesaid continue downward until they meet a
gentler slope and where a said steeper sl01pe above
said gentler slope has an average uniform and
continuous pitch of at least fifty feet between
point "X 1 ' on Exhibit "A" above the said conduit and a gentler sl'ope, the defendant or intervenor is not prohibited from removing earth materials from the said gentler slope, provided that the
arera disturbed is dressed by the party disturbing
the sarne and provided by said party with a
growth of vegetation comparable to the vegetation
on the srope above said disturbed area, within one
year from the commei1ecment of the distnrhance
of said slope. Defendant and intervrenor are enjoined from creating, in the rcni6va1 of the material described in this paragraph of this decree, a
· pitc.h steeped than the said ave:rage pitch of at
least fifty feet down from 1point "X" above the
conduit in the said area disturbed." . .
The suppOJ"ting finding ?f fact is No.14, which
in_ part as ~ ollgws :

r~ads

"~ "" * the court finds that where the existing
slopes below plaintiff's right of way are not now
disturbed by defendant's workings and such slopes
have a pitch steeper than 2 feet horizontal to 1
foo't vertical, such slopes, with their natural
mantle of vegetalion and rock as presently existing are found by the court to be slopes of safety
to plaintifFs condriit and right of 'vay so far as
defendant's or intervenor's responsibility for the
safety of said conduit is concerned. That where
such steeper than 2 foet to 1 foot slopes on their
downw:ucl course from ';Jhrintiff's ~[lid conduit

meet a less steep but uniform slope below and
such steeper slope is uniform and continuous in
pitch for a slope distance of at least 50 feet between the said point "X" on Exhibit "A" above
the conduit and said gentler slope, the court finds
that a continuation of such steeper slope at the
same pitch of said slope existing above said more
gentler slope into and beyond said gentler slol:e
will provide a slope of safety ior plaintiiTs conduit and right of way, provided elc. * * *"
Comparing the provision of the judgment with the
provision of the finding, a difference is discovered. The
judgment refers to "natural slopes as they existed on
January 1, 1948, and where they had, not been, altered by
man." The finding refers to "existing slopes below
plaintiff's right of way'~ '" *not disturbed by defendant's
workings * '» * with their natural mantle of vegetation
and rock as presently existing." This description of the
slopes is definitely tied to the provision following in the
next sentence "where such steeper than 2 f,eet to 1 foot
slopes on their downward course from plaintiff's said
conduit meet a less steep lmt uniform slope below." In
the judgment these sloP'eS are those that not only existed on January 1, 1948, but also "where they had not
been altered 'by man.'' In the finding these slopes are
defined as those "with their natural mantle of vegetation
and rock as presently existing.'' (The judgment was
signed September 1, 1949). The conrt was describing
both in the judgment and the findings, the same slopes
and not different sl>01pes.
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2. The slopes described in said finding are
slopes which were altered by the spilling of material
in digging the conduit trench and the Utah Light and
Railroad Company flume bench.
"The presently existing" slopes of the findings have
been altered 'by the hand of man because the evidence
shows clearly that they had received the soil resulting
f:rom 'the exca,vation of the conduit trench. Their surfaces had been thus changed and their incline planes
altered. Mr. Stal\!er's testimony quoted above indicates
that there must have been substantial alteration in these
incline plane's of the naturtal slope's as they existed prior
to the deposition of the trench spill. The provision of
the judgment is restricted to such slopes "where they had
not been1 altered by man." It is difficult if not impossiMe
to reconcile the slopes of the judgment with the slopes
of the finding. rrhe question is whether or not this difference in definition of slopes prejudices the rights of
the defendant with res1pect to soil removal.

3. The provisions of paragraph 5 of the judgment are therefore broader than correlative provisions of said finding 14, and deprives defendant of
the right to remove material from the area designated in said finding as being above the slopes of
safety of both the right of way and co,nduit.
It is manifest from a study of the relevant provisions of Finding 14 and of Paragraph 5 of the judgment
that the court recognized the fact that he was making
a decree which covered not only defendant's then present
workings (.an area having about 94 feet lateral measure-

men't along the line of the conduit and extending fan
shape down to Wasatch Boulevard) but also the remainder of defendant's ·land where no operations were
heing conducted. He also recognized that the evidence
shows that along the conduit line westerly from defendant's present workings neither the conduit nor the
right of way are uniformly supported by 2 to 1 slopes
or llh to 1 slopes but by numerous s'}opes of much steeper
pitch. 'l'hese areas as stated had not been worked by defendant and were in a condition as they had existed for
years. 'l'he court therefore devised a plan whereby he
adopted these slopes having a. pitch stee:IJer than 2 to 1
or even llh 'to 1, if they extended f'or at least 50 feet he~
tween point "X" on Exhibit "A" and a gentler s}ope
below the conduit, as slopes of safety for the conduit. By
such scheme he permitted the defendant to remove soil
beyond the 50 foot limit down to an underlying sl'ope
which was steeper than 2 to 1 •and llh to 1, if the pitch
of ·that slope represented only an extension of the steep'er
slope as it existed from poin't "X" abov.e the etonduit to
the 50 f.oot limit. 'l'he quoted portion of Finding 14 therefore was based ·on the recognition that along the line
of the conduit the slopes within the 50 foot limit had been
altered by c·asting trench spill U!fJOn them. Theref·ore
they had been ''altered by man.'' 'I' he finding obviously
intended to use these s}opes extending outward of 50 feet
from point "X" on Exhibit "A" as the slopes which
could 'be extended downward as the slopes of safety.
While the exact results 'Of spilling trench material on the
slopes as they existed prior to excavating the trench,
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1
cannot he ascertained, it is clear that substantial alterati'on in their pitch must have occurred as a result of the
addition of this trench dirt. When it came to implementing this part of the finding by the judgment the court
r~stricted its effect to those slopes which had not been
altered by man. By this restriction he therefore eliminated vast areas of the defendant's land from this saving
provisi'On. It is doubtful whether or not there exists any
slopes in defendant's land that were not in some degree
changed hy the spill of trench soil upon them. 'rhe court
in its findi'ng clearly intended to ameliorate the stringency of its pro,posed decree, but in the drafting of the
decree the court virtually eliminated this ameliorating
provision of the finding. As the judgment stands the defendant at its peril must detennine whether or not within the 50 foot limit there is any area where the trench soil
was no't spilled on the slope. It is only in these areas, if
any exist, that it can excavate materbl 'below the 30 foot
limit to the surface of this steeper slope, extending into
the gentler slope. 'rherefore the quoted provision of the
judgment is broader in its op{'rative effect than the court
intended by its finding. The result is that the judgment
takes away from defendant a valuable right which the
court intended to confer upon it by the finding. The
provision of the judgment therefore is not supported by
any consistent finding.

v.
FINDINGS 12, 14 AND 15, AND THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPHS 3, 4 AND 5 OF THE
7t3

I!
\

JUDGMENT, ARE ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A SLOPE OF SAFETY
FOR THE CONDUIT AND A SLOPE OF SAFETY
FOR THE RIGHT OF WAY.
Finding 12 declares:
"That to give ip•roper and adequate security
to plaintiff's right of way for said conduit requires a slope' •of not less than 1 foot horizontal
to 1 foot vertieal at the outer edge of said right
of ·way, which is closer to Wasatch Boulevard,
which said slope, beginning at such outer edge,
is herein designated as the right of way slope
as distinguished from the slope which the court
has referred to herein as the slope of safety for
said conduit. But such slope of 1 foot horizontal
to 1 foot vertical is hereby found to be a slope
of safety for s•aid right of way only when it is
protected by a mantle of shrubs and vegetation
after proper dressing to _remove protruding
boulders and filling in the holes, swales and
other depressions and making a uniform smooth
sl'ope."
Finding 14 provides in part:
''The court in these findings has distinguished between n slope of safety for the plaintiff's
right of way and a slope of safety for plaintiff's
conduit on said right of wa.y. The court finds
that to maintain a ..slope of safety fm said right
of way such slope should commence at the outer
edge of said right of way which outer edge in the
grounu is perpendicularly below· a point 33 feet
on a horizon tal pJ.ane on t from and at right angles
to the center line of plaintiff's conduit, and go
clown the slope fron1 that point to the point where
it intersects the more gentle slope of the slope of
safety for s·aid conduit; that to -maintain a slope
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of safety for said conduit such slope should commence at a point 2 f·e·et vertically above the outer
upper corner of the conduit, which is the upper
corner closest to ·wasatch Boulevard, such sl01pe
to continue downward until it reaches 'Said
W a:satch Boulevard; that the slope of safety
required for said right of way is steeper in 'terms
of horizontal to vertical measurements, 'or the
degree of 'slope, than that required for the slope
of safety for said conduit, the two slopes, however, having their commencement point at different points as hereinabove indicated* * *."
Finding 15 1by aid of Exhibit" A" presents a graphic
demonstration of the material that may be removed by
defendant in its opemtions and thereby the court proceeds to define the slopes of safety of the right of way
as well as the slopes of s~afety for the conduit.
Paragraph 4 of the judgment is based on fmding
15 and implements the same. Paragraph 5 of the judgment appJies alike to the slopes of safety of the right
of way and the 'slopes of safety of the conduit.
Paragraph 3 of the judgment restrains defendant
from removing soil material from the slope below plaintiff's right of way and conduit, which removal will
disturb the slope below plaintiff's right of way and
conduit 1by increasing the pitch of the slope to a steeper
uniform slope than a slope measuring 2 feet horizontal
to 1 foot vertical below said right of way beginning at
the outer edge of said right of way and slopirng downward to the Wasatch Boulevard.

\
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1. The grants of the right of way were for a
water conduit and such right of way is therefore
limited to the uses and extent thereof fixed by said
grants. Plaintiff is the.refore entitled to receive support for said conduit only.
The deed from Haynes (Plaintiff's Exhibit "X")
granted to Salt Lake City "a perpetual right of way
for water conduit.'' The Railway Company's deed conveyed to the plaintiff "a right of way and e•asement f'or
all reservoirs, dams, ditches, conduits, pole lines and
ruppliun,c.es and utHities connected therewith." Both
deeds conveyed an easement for the purpose of eonstructing and operating thereon a water conduit. The
grant therefore, in each instance, is restricted t'o the
purpose of the grant, to-wit: the c~onstructron, operation
and maintenance of a wa:ter conduit. (See authorities
cited under Point III, sub-heading 1.) Since the easement is for the specific and restricted purpose of a conduit, it would seem logically to follow under the authorities cited that the duty and obligation of tho owner of
the servient tenement is to afford support to the conduit
as it is now in place. The right ·of lateral support for
public works, like milroads and canals, seems t~o be
incident to them as it is to lands, but .mch a public works
has no right to lateral support of its structure beyond
the land taken or a1ppropriated for it unless the same
is granted by the act cre,ating the work or by the contract with the land owner. ( Washbu.rn on Real Pro1pr8rty,
page 590, referring to M etropolitan1 Works v. Metropolitan Railroad, LR 3 CP 612, 62'4). The law of lateral
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!'UpporJ as applied· to easements r'emains obscure because
of the lack ·of definitive decisions although as Washburn
states it ''seems to be i~ident to them." Probably the
reason for 1a paucity of authorities specifically applying
the law of lateral support to easements, is due to the
fact that such a.n issue may be resolved between the
owner of the doniinant tenement and the owner of the
se.rvient tenement hy applying the general rule as to the
obligations and duties of the owner of th.e servient tenerrient'toward the owner of tlie dominant t~enement. As the
authorities cited herein pl'ove,the owner of the servient
tenement must respect the rights of the owner of the
dominant tenement by not connnitting nny act which
will interrupt, obstruct or impajr the free use of the
easement by the owner thereof. 'J1he application of this
rule in the instant case would prohibit the defendant
from doing any act which would injure the conduit
or in reasonable probability threaten its safety. Stated
otherwise, the defendant must not in using its own land
produce a condition whicli destroys or would with reasona:ble expectation destroy the -effectiveness of the eonduit.

2. The evidence shows that the condu:t wiU
receive adequate support if the slopes of safety commence at a point 8 to 15 feet from the center line of
the conduit.
. .
.
The plaintiff, over 40 yeats ago, selected the route
of this conduit and built it upon this route, and there
it lias remitined during tl1e iutervenin~ xca rs. There

has been but little maintenance work performed on the
conduit. The berms on the western side, if any ever
existed, have all but disappeared. At several points the
C'onduit remains exposed (R. 673). Under this state of
the evidence the space occupied by the conduit, approximately 41f2 feet in width, seems to fix the width
of the easement necessary for the support of the conduit.
It may well have been that the plaintiff has been rather
careless in the maintenance of this conduit and that it
should have made greater effort in its preserva.tion.
It is apparently upon this basis that witnesses fo:r the
defendant fixed the width of the berm along the west
edge of the conduit. The witness Craven testified:

"Q.

(By Mr. Riter) : Mr. Craven, as a result of
your observation, study and examination
made at the vValker workings, have you
formed any opinion as to the slope that
should be maintained immediately below the
conduit, at this gravel pit, in order to provide necessary stability and safety for the
Big Oottonwood conduit~ Answer 'yes' or
'no.'
A. Yes.
Q. State your conclusion, please.
A. My conc:lusion is that the slope would be llf2
to 1 slope, particularly in running the embankment. There might be s'Olne erosion
through tha:t area, but in the immediate area
under discussion here, a 11f2 to 1 slope would
stand, taking into consideration that there
will be some erosion on that slope, it would
still remain S'afe over a long period of time,
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Q.

A.

Q.
A.
Q.

A.

Q.
A.

excerpt under conditions which it is impossible to design for, such as earthquake, or
flood or cloudbursts, of such proportions that
it would wash the natural material in that
area, to a large extent.
In or'der to afford this necessary stability
and safety for U1e conduit, where should this
11j2 to 1 slope commence"?
In my judgment it should start at a point
far enough out from the west edge of the
conduit, to allow for a cover of two feet for
the conduit; and, in making a rough computation of that, and producing a slope that
'becomes tangent to a small curve on the westerly edge of the conduit, I arrive at a figure
of 8112 feet from the bottom of the base out
to where the slope is.
That would represent the bErm, then?
That would represcmt the berm, opposite the
west edge of the bot tom of the eondui t.
Would that make any diiTerence if you take
the top of the eomlni t from that benn?
'l'he 111-'2 to 1 should be estahllsl1ecl so tl1at
it would take it up to the toe of the conduit,
where the two feet cover would go.
·where would the ho ttolll ol' that s lor1w ho "?
On that computaliou that slope would rontinue clown the hill until it met the natural
slope of the ground, where the embankments
were being made, and when' the material
belo~w the eondnit 'vas not clistnrbecl." (H.
804--805)

Dr. Ferdinand F. Hintze
follows:

ti~t>tified

on this Issue as

"Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Q.

A.

(By Mr. Riter): Dr. Hintze, based on your
observation, and based upon your testimony
of an average s}ope-in some of the slopes
1.48-based also upon your study, based also
upon the history of this deposit, based also
upon the physical condition of the conduit
as it exists over and across the vValker land,
would you say that a slope on the Walker
working of VIz to 1 is ddequate to provide
for that conduit the protection, a reasonably
adequate protecti'on?
I think a VIz slope to 1, would be as safe,
or safer, than the n·atural slopes that are
present adjacent to the \\Talker workings.
(By the Court) : If that slo,pe were left as a
1¥2 to 1, would that increase the City's maintenanC{) problem~
I don't believe it would.
That burden 1
No sir, I don't believe it would.
(By Mr. Holmgren) : ·will you fu the place
where he is starting this slope 1 Are you
going to go from the bottom of the eonduit
or to the top, or where do you start?
(By :Mr. Riter) : Conforming to 1\fr. Holmgren's request, I ask you where would you
fix the beginning point of the 1lf2 to 1 slope?
I would say, in view of the fact that the
c'over of the conduit has not been fully maintained, it has been washed off there, in the
place on the south side of this spot, which
I have now referred to, and has not been
maintained, that it apparently is not considered to be an immediate hazard for a
little of the upper corner of this conduit to
be exposed, and I would think that :if the conduit cover, a.s it now is there, were preserved,
a slope beginning, say, at the upper west edge
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of the conduit-that is the upper edge of
the conduit 'on the west side, the lower side,
if a sl'ope hegins there and leaves the said
covering and whatever covering there is on
the top, there, that that would be adequate,
that would be, as long as that is not washed
away, that there would he no possible chance
of any danger to the conrlnit." (R. 678-679).
Reconcilement of the testimony of defendant's witnesses with that of the plaintiff's witnesses is not difficult. It is a.pparent upon reading the testimony of City
Engineer Beers (R. 249) that his opinion rests entirely
upon his assumption that the city possessed a 66 foot
right of way. He stated that he would start the slope of
safety at the edge of the right of way 33 feet from the
center of the conduit (R. 248-249). The following interesting colloquy between the court and J\Ir. Beers clearly
confirms this assumption:
"THE COURT: ::\[r. Holmgren, he sta.te'd
that the two tro one should be maintained from a
point 33 feet ont from the center of the conduit.
He did not say .in reference to the elevation
whether the center of the bottom or the cenh~r
of the top, or half way up. If you are talking
:rbout lateral support, that might be important.
"Q. \Vhat point did you have in mind?
A. I had in mind that we had a right to set
out a right-of-way :;;; feet wide. \Ve have a
right to maintain that material in its present
condition." (R 231)
Later on the following interclwngl:' occurreu:

"Q.

(By the Court): The thirty-three feet out,
is that from the top of the conduit or the
bottom or the middle 7
A. From the middle.
Q. It is a question of elevation in the middle.
You me~an half-way up the conduit¥
A. I don't understand your question. The hill
has a slope. I assume you have a right-ofway of 33 feet. You have to take that slope
where it hits in horizontally, that distance
out. It may be h'orizontal, hut as far as that
slope hits.
THE COURT: If that testimony is based on
what he thinks is the right-of-way, I c:ould not
consider his testimony, because it is not based
on a slope of necessity or need, but it is based
on what he thinks the city had a deed to." (R.
252)

L~ater

the record shows :
(Mr. Riter) As he [Beers] is testifying, he
mixes engineering and law, principally. If the
court please, I don't think he is qualified on
that. \Ve are admitting his qualifications as an
engineer, 'hut when he mixes his law and his engineering, I object to that.
THE COURT: rrhe objection is sustained.
If he is basing it on what the grHnt happens to be
right now, that is a long way from what he is
qualified t·o answer. It is a questi'on of what is
nec~ssary, not what he has as a matter of grant.''
(R. 253)

Notwithstanding Mr. Beer's opinion, which was
obviously based upon the assumption that the city owned
the 33 feet right of way, the witness Gardner, assistant
city engineer, made this startling declaration:
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"Q. How far out should the sl-o1pe start1
A.

I would say the slope-that would depend
entirely on the erosion.
Q. Well, right here on this section'?
Q. (By Hiter) ln the critical section we are
dealing with.
A. I would say that it should start not less than
15 feet out. We should have a 15 foot berm,
not less than that, anywhere.
Q. (By the Court) l;) feet out from the center
line of the bottom of the conduit, from there
on what would yoiu safety slope require?
A. I would say not lc;:.;s than two t'o one.
Q. (By ,\fr. Riter) 'l1 hat is your testimony~
A. 'l'hat is my testimony." ( R. 217)
Professor .1\farsell, the star witness for plaintiff,
expressecl this opinion:
"Therefore, 1 think that even that slope
would have to he maintained by additions throughout the years, as protection to replace the material removed by erosion. Therefore, I would want
to see a berm wide enough for, I would say, ten
or twelve feet . or more along- the conduit line,
on the down slope side, with a rounded shoulder,
and a slope of 2 to 1 from there on down to the
plane that would i1~tersect tfw County highway."
(R. 347)
The evidence of both plaintiff and defendant therefore appears to sustain the conclusion that the conduit
will receive adequate support if the siopes of saftety
commence at a point 8 to 15 feet from the center line
of the conduit. This will provide a berm of adequate
width not only for the maintenance and repair of the
conduit hut as a po<iirt of commencement of the slopes
of safety.
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S. The Court's findings relat:ve to slopes of
safety for the right of way and provisions of the
judgment based thereon are extraneous to the issues
in this case and deprive defendant of material which
otherwise would have been available to it above the
slopes of safety of the conduit.
'The primary and fundamental concern of the plaintiff is to maintain its conduit in a safe o:perating condition. It is entitled to prevent su,ch disturbances o.f the
soil condition in the proximity' of the conduit which
threaten with a reasonable degree of probability the
stability of th'e conduit. 'The issue, in this case as framed
by the pleadings pertains to the safety 'of the eonduit
and not the safety of the right of way. It is neWwr
necessary nor legally proper to detJermine the slopes
of safety of the right of way. That is an extraneous
issue which has only remote, if any, bearing on the vital
issue in this litigation. This question at this point cross'es
the question as to the width of the right of way in Section 25. The width of the necessary berm undoubtedly
has a direct bearing in determining the width of the
right of way in Section 2~5. The evidence appears to
point in the direction of the conclusion that the width
of the right of way in Section 25 is 30 feet, viz., 15 feet
on each side of the c1ente~ line of the conduit. However,
with the width of the right of way in Section 25 undetermined, the question as to a slope of safety for the
right of way was never reached, and no finding on this
point should haV'e been made.
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As to the right of way in Section 24, its width was
determined hy the Haynes grant, but the absence of
evidenee as to the location of the conduit on the right
of way also produces a situation where the question
as t·o the slope of safety of the right of way is extraneous to the issues in this case. In Section 24 the plaintiff
also seeks to protect the conduit, and it is the slope of
safety of the conduit which is an issue. Even with the
width of the right of way in Sec,tion 2-! clef1nitelyfixed by
the grant, an issue as to a slope of safety of the right
of way has no 'bearing on the question as to the slope
of safety of the conduit. It must be remembered that
the easement in Section 24 was for the specific purpose
of constructing and maintaining a conduit and for no
other purpose, therefor'e the issue pertains solely to a
slope of safeity for the conduit.

VI.
mE JUDGMENT IS INDEFINITE, VAGUE
AND AMBIGUOUS AND IMPOSSIBLE OF COMPLIANCE BY THE DEFENDANT AND INTERVENOR.
The defendant, pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the judgment, applied to the .court for authority to serve and file
its applicatron for a suipplementa1 judgment requiring the
plaintiff to mark and stake upon the ground the west
boundary line of its i·ight of way easement as same extends across Section 24 and 25 aforesaid, when the width
of the right of way easement across sai'd Section 25 is
determjned by the court and also to require the plaintiff
to make certain cross section surveys over. defendant's

land below plaintiff's conduit, and t'O file in the court and
cause the field notes thereof and other proper maps and
records of such surveys. (R-95, 96, 97, 102). The court
denied defendant's motion.
The future administration of the court's judgment
in this case is of great importance both to the plaintiff
and defendant. The court has retained jurisdiction over
the case in order "to modify, enlarge, or otherwise
change the terms hereof, for the protection of plaintiff's
said conduit and right of way.'' (Paragraph 7 J udgment). 'I'he factual situation presented by the exhaustive
evidence is clearly indicative of the promise of situations
arising in the future, which will demand that the court
exercise this continuing jurisdiction without putting
defendant to the risk of contempt of court in order to
'Protect the plaintiff's conduit and also to prevent the
judgment from acting as an instrument of confiscation
of defendant's land. This is an entirely proper funct.:on
of a court of equity and is not unusual in judgments of
this nature.
It is the claim of defendant that notwithstanding the
elaborate exhibits in this case and the information furnished by witnesses that there should be made a part of
the records of this case certain vital and statistical information for future use and reference. 'I'he judgment
was signed and filed September 1, 1949. The defendant
believes that ail parties to this action are entitled to the
preservation for future reference, data and cross section
surveys which will definitely reveal as of said date, the
contours of the slopes on defendant's land below the con-
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duit. 'fhis informati'on is of particular importance in
view of the alternative method of operation offered the
defendant and intervenor by Paragraph 4 of the judgment.
The fact must be emphasized that at the time of the
trial'of thi s action, only a very small part of defendant's
land had been worked. The actual opera6'on had been
conducted in an area which measured approximately
94 feet laterally along the line of the conduit and thence
fanning out in the direction of \Vasatch Boulevard below.
Defendant's Exhibit 47 is a map of the !property in this
area over which defendant may in the future operate.
The C'ourt's judgment covers not only the small area
which had been actively excavated up to the date of
the judgment, but also all of the property of defendant
below the eonduit. Compared with prospective operations
the operations within the 94 foot fan are very small.
Defendant is concerned with its futllre operations over
more extended areas.
If at ·some future date one of the parties to this
action applies to the court for a modification of its judgment beyond all peradventure the factual question will
arise as to the actual conditions on the ground at the
time the judgment became effective. For this reason the
defendant asserts that the court should have directed that
immediate surveys be made in order to supply a basis
of fact for fnture adjustments of the judgment.
The defendant 01perates under this judgment at its
peril. It is therefore entitled to have placed in the record,
official informntion ns to the conditions preYailing at the
1

time of judgment. Without such infonnation which was
procured under the 'Order of the court and which would
stand as part of the official record of the court, the
defendant will be prejudiced and damaged in the future
use of its land. Conditions may arise where it will be
a disputed issue 'Of fact as to whether, for example, a
given piece of excavation comes within the authorization
of Paragraph 5 of the judgment. The court certainly
possesses the power to secure this information and to
apportion the costs thereof between the plaintiff, defendant and intervenor. There was certainly nothing
unreasonable in defendant's petition for this relief. The
necessity for the compilation and impounding of this information is emphasized by other considerations herein
submitted.

1. There is no requirement in said judgment
that a survey shall be made whereby the location of
the boundary line of plaintiff's right of way on the
side nearest W'asatch Boulevard will be determined
so that same way may be marked upon the ground
and the record thereof preserved in the court's file
in this action.
The a:hsence from the judgment of the location of the
west boundary line of plaintiff'rs right of way is the direct
result of the court's refusal to adjudicate such question
under defendant's application authorized by Paragraph
6 of the judgment. The marking of the western boundary
line of the conduit in Section 24 would be an inexpensive
engineering operation because the right of way over that
section is 66 feet wide. Obviously the markihg 'Of the
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boundary line in the section would expedite operations
under the judgment.
There has been discussed at length in this brief the
refusal of the court to define the width of the right of
way over Section 2:5. In this section in particul'ar is it
vital that the width of this right of way he determined
and marked upon the ground. The failure or refus·al of
the court to make a definitive finding of fact on this issue
produces an error that runs through the entire judgment
· with respect to Section 25, and produces an ambiguity
and uncertainty which makes the judgment almost impos'sible of 'administration. If the court had determined
the width of 'this right of way and caused the western
boundary thereof to he marked on the ground, and had
ordered appropriate cross section surveys to be made
and recorded, questions as to whether or not future operations 'Of the defendant violated or confonned to the !fll'Ovisions of the judgment would present no insurmountable
issue of fact.

2. There is no requh'ement in said judgment
that a survey shall be made whereby the location of
the center line of plaintiff's conduit will be determined so that same may be marked upon the ground
and the record thereof preserved in the court's file
in this action..
Ref~rence

to Exhibit ''A'' of the judgment reveals
how vital the information as to the location of the center
line of the conduit is in ascertaining slopes of safety of
the conduit. This is information which should be preserved in the official records of this case and it is not a

burden which should be cast upon the defendant -and intervenor alone. The plaintiff ha;s an equal interest in the
preservation of such evidence. It must be remembered
that the defendant has as great a right to use its land
for lawfu'l purposes as the plaintiff has to maintain the
integrity of its conduit. The mechanizing of operati'ons
under the court's judgment is not a mere matter of convenience for the defendant; it is also a matter of sincere
importance to the plaintiff. Time and again the phrase
''center line of the conduit'' appears in the findings and
judgment. The court did not adopt plaintiff's Exhibit
"J" as demonstrating the official center line of the conduit and as this exhibit stands in the record it is notmng
more than evidence. The center line of the conduit A.s
delineated on Exhibit "J" may or may n'Ot be correct,
but at least if it had been adopted by the court or -a
1proper finding that it did show the center line, there
might have been s•omething tangible on which to hang
the slopes of safety. However, -a survey made under
order of the court with appropriate staking of the center
line of the conduit on the ground would furnish a basi's
for the slopes 'Of safety described in the judgment which
cannot now be discovered in the findings.

vn.
THE EVIDENCE PREPONDERATES THAT

MAXIMUM SLOPES OF 1

* TO 1 ARE SLOPES

OF SAFETY FOR PLAINTIFF'S CONDUIT WITHOUT REGARD TO THE SURFACE CONDITIONS
OF THE SLOPES.

1. Summary.of .plaintiff's evidence .. ~
·Plaintiff's conduit had been in operation and use
for over 40 years at the time of the trial. The method
of its construction and installation. was descriJJ(1d 'by
plaintiff's witness Staker, and sufficie:qt of his. testimony
has been set forfh in thisbrie£ to inform the. court. as to
the nature of the conduit and the lil~thods pursued in its
constru.ction. Of. primary.importance is information as
to the geological historyof ,the area in \Vhich defendant's
land is located and through which the conduit •passes.
The plaintiff obviously submitted its evidence on
the theory that a slope of 2 feet hori110ntal to 1 foot
vertical is necessary to afford reasonab~e support for
the c.onduit. To prove its contention it presented Professor Ray E. Marsell, of the University of Utah faculty,
who testified at length concerning the geological origin
of the soil deposition at the mouth of Big Cotto11woocl
Canyon. Of great relevancy is information as to the
composition and compactness of the deposit; its tendency
to erode and ravel; the effect .of frost, water and wind
upon it, _and its ability .to support the conduit ·with
reasonable degree of safety for an indefinite future time.
Professor J\Iarsell demonstrated his testimony by a
great num'her of photographs and diagrams. The area
had been under his observation for several months prior
to trial. As an expert Professor nlarsell exrpresscd the
opinion that the deposit at the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon had been vmshccl out of the canyon and
thereafter the waters of L:tke Bonneville ro:::e to what

is known as the Bonneville stage of this prehistoric lake.
"It lapped against this deposit." But the action of the
lake water on the deposit had practically no affect. (R.
394). He considers that the Walker deposit resembles
that of a glacial moraine (R. 396), and that it was not
laid down in still water because it has no forset beds
(R. 398). He 'believes that the material at the Walker
pit is not compacted material and that the compactness
that it does possess arose as a result of a sorting process
of the water (R. 392). He testified further that the
\Valker deposit is composed of unconsolidated material
but is locally cemented (R. 405 ). It was Professor Marsell's final conclusion that a slope of safety required
to protect the conduit should he not less than a slope
of 2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical with a 10 to 12
foot berm (R. 346, 347 and 496). He reached this conclusion by reference to Plaintiff's Exhibit "P" which
shows an average profile t)'lpical of the profile of spurs
in the vicinity of the gravel pit. The present ·walker
pit is located on a spur (R. 346). This ·witness was frank
in admitting that whether the slope of safety be 2 to 1
or 1% to 1 it would require seasonal maintenance and
that the difference in the amount of maintenance would
he very slight (R. "543).
Plaintiff's case rests upon Professor Marsell's testimony, although the City Engineer, W. D. Beers, expressed the opinion that u 2 to 1 slope was necessary to support the conduit (R. 249). He testified further that
during his incumbency as city engineer that to his knowledge there bad been no occasion to make repairs on the
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conduit embankment, and the city had not to his knowledge taken any action as to erosion (R. 257). As has
been heretofore demonstrated, Mr. Beer's testimony
as to the necessity for a 2 to 1 slope in Section 25, is
qualified by his assumption that the plaintiff's right
of way over that section is 66 feet in width (R. 252).

2. Summary of defendant's and intervenm·'s
evidence.
As may be expected in litigation of this nature
wherein expert testimony 1plays such a vital part there
are sharp differences of opinion on the part of the
experts. A review of the transcript of the evidence will
show that each witness was subjected to careful examination and cross examination and thereby the differences in their conclusions were sharpened and amplified.
It is recognized by counsel that in an::tlyzing the evidence
it is not a. proposition of simply "counting heads" of th2
experts and thereby concluding that the preponderance
of the evidence is in favor of one side or the other.
A critical consideration, not only of the training and
experience of these witnesses, but also of their opportunity of observation of tho critical area, is highly uecessary. Further, their experience in dealing with g'eological aud engin0erin2; 11roblems counts heavily in weighing their testimony. A complete ro:oumc of the evidence
in this brief y,ronld be nolhiug more 1ltan reproducing
the transcript. Since printe(1 ahstmcb of the record
have been abolished i11 this tribwwl, it is hopocl by
counsel, tlw t the Supreme Cou ;· t l!l coD side rin':!,' th)s c:csc:,

will review the testimony of the witnesses as it appears
in the transcript, and that due and proper consideration
will be given to the numerous exhibits which were introduced in evidence. There are several of the exhibits
which are of prime importance although all of them
when considered with the testimony have rele-:ancy and
materiality. The defendant herein will attemp to su 'marize cogently and as briefly as possible, the e ilen (
which it believes supports its contention lwre~n. '>c~.e
real issue involved in this action is whether a slope of
2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical is a necessary slope
of safety to support plaintiff's conduit. Plaintiff's entire
evidence was directed to the affirmative of this issue.
The defendant denies that a slope of 2 to 1 is necessary
to give the requisite support, and asserts that a slorc
of llh feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical would afforJ
the conduit such reasonable support as would assure its
safety for an indefinite period in the future. Superficial
consideration might lead to the conclusion that this difference was merely a theoretical one and that in the
ultimate results the sustaining of plaintiff's position
would not seriously limit the defendant in the operations
of its lands nor inflict any damage upon it. However,
an examination of the conditions existing on the slopes
below the conduit will reveal that a slope of 2 to 1 will
prevent the defendant from availing itself of thousands
of cubic yards of soil material which otherwise would
have been available for processing and disposition. The
trial court by offering the defendant an alternative
method of operation undoubtedly recognized this fact
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and endeavored to ameliorate its mandates if it held
strictly to its conclusions that a 2 to 1 slope was necessary to afford reasona:ble support to the conduit. It is
the contention of defendant that the evidence preponderatingly shows that the basic slope ::;hould be 1¥2 feet
horizontal to 1 foot vertical in::;tead of 2 feet horizontal
to 1 foot vertical. The court in its judt,:rruent adopt::; as a
'basic premise the 2 to 1 slope and thereafter introduce::;
its modifications which is intended to lessen the har::;hness of such conclusion. rrhe defendant in oppo::;ing this
proposition re::;pectfully submits that the basic slope
should be 11;2 to 1, and upon 8Uch premise the variations
and exceptions written into the judgment should he
based. It is upon this theory tlmt the defendant submits
for consideration the analy::;is of the evidence hereafter
set forth.
(a) The conduit has been and is supported
in main by slopes averaging less tha~z 11;2 to 1.
Plaintiff's Exhibit "0" and "P" (R 280-282, 28i~)
exemplify a profile of a typical slope in the vicinity of
the active gravel pit, located ~,000 feet south from the
pit. This slope is shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit "I", a
photograph, near Ravine 1 (R. 283). The plaintiff placed
great stress upon Exhibit "P" as demonstrating the
effect of erosion upon this area. However, Profe::;sor
Marsell in his examination of the territory found sl01pes
along the conduit embankment as steep as 1.28 to 1,
which were natural undisturbed slopes (R. 434). These
slopes have stood for 40 years without maintenance or
reconstruction. The intervenor, during thi'S time, made
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no provision for the drainage of ·wasatch Boulevard in
the immediate vicinity of the ·walker pit, because of the
absorptive power of the surrounding soil and earth (R.
435). In Ravine 4 as appears on Plaintiff's Exhibit
"Q", the slopes within 20 feet of the bottom of the
ravine, are 1..51 to 1, 1.37 to 1, and 1.28 to 1 (R. 444).
The measurements of the slopes on Plaintiff's Exhibits
"Q" and "R," are the steepest angles of the slopes
(R ~±GO). The Co<.mty in building ·wasatch Boulevard
in 1D18 maJe a cut o£ approximately 1.25 to 1 (R. 480).
ny rcl'e;ring to Plaintiff's Exhibit "R," with use of
the O'.'erlay (Plaintiff's Exhibit "Q," R. 290), there is
re;,·ealed the topography of the area appearing on Plaintiff's ExhiLit "I," the photograph. In Ravine 1, as
located on these exhibits, a slope of 1.7 to 1 is discovered. In explaining the sharpness of the slope discovered by him, Professor .Marsell said:
"The only slopes that I have been able to
find that are as steep or f:lteeper than the slope
that we have mentioned so frequently, 1lj2 to 1,
are on thof:le areas that l1ave been affected artificially, or those surfaces that are descending
to tlte ravines, the slopes that descend to the
ravines.'' ( R 29'1).
On the east bank of Ravine 4 (Plaintiff's Exhibit
"P") within 50 feet of the eonduit, up above it and up
the slopes and in the ravine, there was found by Professor ::Jarsell, a slope with the ratio of 1.28 to 1. Further to the southeast along one of the cut banks remainiug al'ter GO years along the power company's grade,
is one bank underneath a normal mantle, with a slope
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of 1 to 1 ( R 335). Along the same hank where the brush
is absent, the slope ratio underneath the rim is 1.37 to 1
(R. 336). The slope of 1.28 to 1 is a natural slope inside
of the ravine, which was perhaps 50 feet long, sloping
down the side of the ravine (R. 336). In Ravine 7 on
Plaintiff's Exhibit "I" several measurements show
slopes as steep as 1.31 to 1. Professor Marsell made
the following comment:
''In the production of the grade for the power
line, fifty years ago, much of the waste material
was dumped over the slope, and it came to an
angle of repose which is on the average for 20 feet
below the original ditch, 1.5 to 1, the angle of
repose for that aggregate of loose material of that
character. w·here there has been brush, the brush
that develops tends to hold the boulders, particularly the sumac, on the upper side of the
stems or limbs of the trees and brush. These
boulders accumulate in a nest like a clutch of eggs,
and in some of these locations in the oak brush,
particularly the scrub oak, I have measurements
of 1.51 to 1; 1.41 to 1; and measurements as low
as 1.28 to 1 in place::; underneath the conduit; but
those are all disturbed areas, and as far as I am
able in my experience to judge, they meet the
studies I have made. 'L'hey are not typical of the
natural slopes." (H. 337).
In considering the data submitted by Professor
:Marsell as to the slopes found 'by him below the conduit,
it is recommended that close study be given to Plaintiff's
Exhibit "I" as correlated to Plaintiff's Exhibits "P,"
"Q," "R," "S" and "T." It should be horne in min<l
that Professor Marsell made all his measmements at
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right angles to the slopes and not at right angles to the
conduit. If his ideal slope of 2 to 1 were placed against
the conduit, in its turning and twisting around the hillside, following the contour thereof, it might in one
place be a 2 to 1 slope, and 10 feet away this slope would
be 1l_h to 1 or 1 to 1.
Turning now to the measurements made by Dr. Hintze
on l\Iay 25th and 2Gth, 19-19 (R. G57, 658), these weTe
measurements from the conduit down toward Ylasatch
Boulevard (R 657). He Jiscovered dip slopes of 30
degrees (R. 658). A di'P' of 30 degrees would be a 1.73
to 1 slope. They were made mostly on spurs, and not
in ravines, located \Vithin 500 feet south from the spur
on w·hich the ·walker workings are located (R 660).
There are other slopes measuring as follows: 28 deg'rees,
or 1.88 to 1; 41 degrees or 1.15 to 1; 3G degrees or L38
to 1. The a \'erage of these readings is about 34 degrees
or 1.38 to 1 (R. 661) .
.i\1r. J. n. ·walker, president of defendant company,
also made observations on the ground as to the prevailing slopes in that area. Referring to Plaintiff's J1Jxhihit
"I," he testifwcl that north of the line marked "H"
thereon, the slopes below the conduit with two exceptions,
arc of a revose of approximately 1.3 to 1. At the north
end of the vValker property the slopes approach 1l_h to 1
(R. 84:)). In the arc>a between the line marked "H"
and the line ntark£~<1 "C" on Exhibit "I," there is an
intact slo<pe of about 1.23 or 1.3 to 1 (R. 844). Mr.
Walker c}wclzed the slopes described by Dr. Hintze (R.
84±, 8-15). Partir:ularly did Mr. ·walker checl\ the slopes
1Ul

within the area between the gate valve on Plaintiff's
I:Gxhibit "I," and approximately one half the distance
between the gate valve and arrow marked '' S. '' Mr.
Walker measured these slopes by establishing a point at
right angles to the conduit and with a tape measured
the dista:n,ce between the conduit and the established
point (R. 845). The slopes measured by Mr. Walker in
this area were each from 1. to 1; 1.23 to 1; 1.3 to 1; 1.4
to 1. The slope of natural repose in this area is about
1.3 to 1. In his observation he never found a slope of
1 Y2 to 1 (R. 846). In the area commencing 100 feet
north of the gate valve shown on Plaintiff's .BJxhibit
"I," the slopes are more stable and have not been disturbed. They stand with an average of 1.25 to 1, and LJ
to 1 for fifteen or sixteen hundred feet (R. 856). vVith
the exception of two little spurs-one where the present
pit is located, and one at the end of defendant's pro1perty,
these are all filled slopes which have stood since the
conduit was built. The natural mantle existing on the
slopes north and west of the present workings is very
sparse. The area has regularly been burned over on an
average of every three or four years (Defendant's Exhibits 20, 50, 51; R. 847). The rock mantle in that area
is rock placed at the time of the construction of the
conduit (R. 847).
Professor Marsell undoubtedly summarized his conclusion as to a slope of safety for the conduit thus:
"Therefore, I would suggest that, inasmuch
as this profile on Exhibit "P" shows an average
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slope, throughout the steeper portion of it, of
1.95 to 1, we should ask certainly for nothing
steeper, because the substitute slope must necessarily be a new surface created of unconsolidated material (R. 346). * • • Therefore, I would
want to see a berm wide enough for, I would say,
ten or twelve feet or more along the conduit line,
on the down slope side, with a rounded shoulder,
and a slope of 2 to 1 from there on down to the
plane that would intersect the County highway."
(R. 347).
The plaintiff built its case around the demonstration
indicated on its Exhibit "P" and deduced therefrom
the conclusion stated by Professor Marsell. The defendant controverts this conclusion on the basis that
Exhibit "P" does not t}~pify the slope conditions in this
area which have existed for over 40 years. During this
time the conduit has been operated with a minimum of
maintenance, if there has 'been any maintenance (R 257258). There is not a line of evidence in this case that
the conduit has been displaced or its underpinning and
support impaired. Defendant conscientiously believes
that the evidence proves that the average slopes below
the conduit in the direction of \Va.satch Boulevard have
been and are steeper than 1¥2 feet horizontal to 1 foot
vertical. Over and above the detailed technical evidence
of the experts there is one fact that stands as self
evident and that is that the conduit has been supported since it was constructed across the ·walker land,
by slopes less than 1¥2 to 1. A close study of the evi'dence suggests strongly the idea. that no 2 to 1 slope
below the conduit actually exists on the Walker land, and
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never has existed. If there are any such slopes they
are exceedingly few. vVhile the judgment does not
require the defendant to build 2 to 1 slopes where none
natural1y existed, the case for the plaintiff appears to
resolve itself into one where a 2 to 1 slope has heen
created on paper but no such slore actually exists on
the ground. There is demonstrated hrre again tlw hasis
of defendant's contention that the court should han·
orde1·ed cross section surveys of SH<'h fre(ll18ncy as to
demonstrate that its findings an<l judgment are based
on ph~·sica] facts and not on mere hypot1Jetieal dcduetions.
Unrlouhtedly the court's findings and jndgt:JPnt represent his sincere and lwnest opinion of what slopes
should 'he maintained in order to give reasona1Jlc support
to the condnit, hut it is submitted th:tt the most f~wor
able interpretation of the evidence docs not support tlJis
conclusion.
(b)

An average slope of 1Jj2 to 1, zcith
the nahtre authorized by Paragraph
5 of the judgment, will afford ad.eq_uate protection fo.r the conduit.
Opposed to Professor l\:farsell 's conclusion that a
2 to 1 slope is necessary to give adequate support to
the conduit, is the testimony of an equally learned and
experienced geologist and competent and experienced
engineers. Their considered opinions have largely been
ignored by the court in formulating the fiwlings and
judgment.
~·arianccs of

Dr. Hintze differed in some res p:::cts from Proi'cm:Jol'

Marsell in hi'S hi'Storical ac::ount of the sand an::l gravel
deposit at the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon. He
stated:
"So I prefer to consider this material o£ ~he
\Valker pit as being a part of a deposit which was
laid in Lake Bonneville. Now, I do not believe
that it mali.:es a very great deal of difference
whether it was laid in Lake Bonneville or whether
it was laid up as a slope which was laid in water.
I think we are agreed on that. It was water-borne,
and water-laid material, without a doubt. So, as
to whether 1\.Ir. 1\[arsell 's view, or the older and
more general view, that these deposit'S belong to
the Lake Bonneville stage, would not have too
much to do with this case. However, that it was
laid in water is very important, because any
material deposited in water is apt to be compacted and particles settle and adjust themselves
and get into a settled condition in water, much
more so than out there in the stock pile which
i'S being formed by the material loosely clumped
down in the valley. * * * I regard this deposit,
therefore partially cemented, as it seems to be,
from this position here, and partially compacted
as well settled material. r_rhat is the way I would
like to dcscri'!Je it-well settled material, partially
cemented; and I think that partial cementation
runs throughout the deposit, he.cause I have a
specimen here that I got out of the Walker pit
this morning-one in particular, that-if I might
have the privilege of vresenting it now, I would
like to lJl'P~ent it, heeause we are just about reaching a ~;topping point." (R. 612, 61:3). Defendant's
l~xhihits 27 (H. G21); Exhibit 28 (R. 628); and
J'Jxhihit 2~) (R G30), demonstrated the cementation of the deposit."
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The exhibits last mentioned by Dr. Hintze, together
with defendant's Exhibits 4 to 15, are fairly and reasonably representative of the contents of the Walker deposit.
The deposit possesses coherence and compa~ctness (R.
634).
Dr. Hintze declared with respect to the excavations
of defendant:
"I do not believe that the excavations have
produced anything that might be regarded with
apprehension." (H. 675).
He further stated that the removal of the soil had
not altered the drainage of Havine 6 and 7 (R. 675).
Further commenting, he said:
'' \Ve see scars in these photographs, the
scars north of Gulches 4, or Havine 4, 5 and G
are V'ery ipronounced, and, for the most part,
have no vegetation growing on them. Yet, after
about fifty years they show this tendency for very
slow erosion on the surface, with some rna terial
rolling down to the foot of the slope, and the upper
part of the slope taking on that extra steepness
which has been emphasized here. I think the very
top of each one of these slopes is steeper than
the slope itself, in the main part; so the surface
is a kind of concave surface that flattens out at
the base and becomes medium in the middle
reaches, and then rises to an extra declivity near
the top. That, r think, is the effect of erosion
on the denuded surface's. Elsewhere more of the
slopes are covered with bushes of considerable
size, which have grown up ov~r the years; never
were disturbed by the workings or construction
of the conduit. So, it is hard to say just how
old they are, but they may be hundreds of ~·ears
old-if nny plant can live that long. Otherwise,
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they are a younger generation, with the older
ones died off and gone, perhaps, hut I would still
believe that the slo1pe has probably been covered,
and may have been forested, as pointed out here,
long ago when the climate was more favorable to
plant growth than it is at the present time. So,
my judg1nent would be that any reasonable slope,
as the slope of 1 to 1, or 11;2 to 1, or 2 to 1, would
be a reasonable slope (R. 677). * * * A 11;2 slope
to 1, would be as safe, or safer, than the natural
slopes thal are present adjacent to the Walke.r
u:orkin:;s." (R. 678) .
.L~s

heretofore recited in Dr. Hintze's testimony,
this slope of 11;2 to 1 would commence at the upper west
edge of the conduit (R 679). He finally emphasized
his position by stating:
"Of conr:;e, if you undermine it (the conduit)
that is a different matter, but if you have a slope
of 1 to 1, or anything greater than 1 to 1, I t}~:n'
you have a very safe slore? e':ce0t fer t'v'::c -,,
f1oo~ls, or somethin!j li:::e that, which P<'Y ft i
this. If they did, around th~ s SflL', a
'
slor:-e, as the question r'-'OiJOS2l Ol' I'C: . -. •
would te extl'a safe. I thinlr i: -r:oul~~- .. v--extra snfe, a slope like that."
In response to a question by counsel for the intervenor as to how mucl1 more rapidly e.::·osion woui -: r_ffcct
the slope of 11;2 to 1 as it would a slope of 2 to 1 on the
kind of material that is exposed at the VT alker pit, Dr.
Hintze replied:
'' rrhe illlmeuiate effect on the material, I
think, would not be very different in those two
cases, for the reason that they are both very l1igh
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slopes for running water. * * * So, when you talk
about the difference between the erosion on a
slope of 1% and the erosion on a 2 to 1 slope1% to 1, or 2 to 1-you are not talking ahout
anything very different. * * * But it is not a
<lUestion, in my mind, as to a 2 to l slope being
much safer than a l% to 1. gven a l to l slope
there, I think you would maintain them all, and
the maintenance o.f one \Vould not be very different from the maintenance of another." (R. 683).
Mr. John E. Kay, Assistant County }1~ngineer, directed the improvement of Wasatch Boulevard. His experience as an engineer in this type of work peculiarly
qualifies him as an expert. He was asked :
'' * * * what, in your 01pinion, should be the
slope to give adeqate support to the Salt Lake
City conduit?" (R 718).
He responded:
''In this particular area I would sa.y from
a 1 to 1 to a 2 to l, would not make any difference,
it would he just as substantial."
Further interrogation of him was as follows:

"Q.
A.

That is, you make no distinction hetwe1en a
l to 1 ancl a 2 to l ¥

No.

"I would say very definitely that a 1:Y2 to 1
slope would be flat enough to take care of anything that I might find along there, and I based
that, with reference to the slope's that I saw,
both along that area that appeared to have stood
there for years on end." (R.. 765).
The following pertinent colloquy contained in the
testimony is quoted:
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'' Q.

In your surveys that you made of the vValker
gravel pit area, did you find steeper slopes
than llh to 1 ~
A. I did.
Q. ·where are they~
A. As shown on Exhibit 26, I have noted here a
slope that was approximately 100 feet northwest of the manhole. 'J1hat slope is steeper
than llh to 1.
Q. Is that the natural slotpe?
A. 'l'lmt is the natural slope here, inasmuch
as it appears not to have been disturbed for
years. It may have been disturbed at the time
the conduit was built-I don't know.
Q. Can you identify that natural slope upon
Exhibit I1
A. It is approximat~ely in this location (indicating).
Q. \V ell now, you have to indicate that, for the
benefit of the record.
A. 'l'here is a dotted ink line, marked ''G.''
Q. (By the Court) That is a cross section, isn't
it 1
A. Yes, sir.
Q. (By 1\L-. Hiter) It appears on defendant's
Exhibit 261
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In reaching the conclusion just stated, have
you considered the etfect of rainfall or rnoishue upon the workings~
A. You mean in the vicinity of this vVallcer pit1
Q. Yes.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. On the slopes 7
A. On the Rlopes. That material is of such a
nature tlw t there docs not appear to be any
rnn-off. 'l'hc water appears to immediately
soak in as it falls.
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Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

In your experience with the slo1pes of 11/2
to 1 that you have described, you consider
the factor of safety is the same in both 1
Yes.
And you selected a. 1 to 1 for the purpose
of this highwa.y1
],or economic reasons, yes.
Considering the, factor of safety7
Yes. If I may, I will qualify that statement
by 'Saying 'whatever slope is established,
or whatever the highway slope is placed
upon, I will qualify that statement by saying that the slope should be trimmed, the
loose material taken off, and the slope rounded at the top with probably a. 20 foot radius.

"' "'
Q.

A.

Q.
A.

.

(By Mr. Riter) Then, Mr. Kay, with your
qualifwation, that would have been the policy
prevailing in this area on any cuts that you
made for this highway7
Yes.
And those are on a 1 to 1 slope~
The way they are designed, a 1 to 1 slope,
yes.'' (R. 720).

The testimony of Mr. Jack H. Craven, an experienced, qualified engineer, has heretofore been set forth
at length under Point V, sub-para.gmph 1. It is only
necessary to re-quote the statement he made in response
to the question as to his opinion concerning the slope
that should be maintained in order to provide necessary
stability and safety for the conduit. He declared:
''My conclusion is that the slope would be
1% to 1 slope, particularly in running the emhankmen t" ( R. 804),
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Mr. LeRoy C. Chadwick, defendant's engineer, who
prepared its Exhibits 23, 24, 25 and 26 (R 556, 558,
560, 762), after describing his experience on numerous
occasions with filled slopes declared that the standard
for years had been for a slope of llh to 1 and that all
filled slopes for highways and railroads-the filled slopes
according to accept'ed standards were 11f2 to 1, and that
cut slopes were 1 to 1 or steeper (R. 764). He gave a
definite opinion as to the slopes below the plaintiff's
conduit which would afford the required feature of
safety in supporting the conduit, as follows:
Q. (con 'td.) Have you ever had an opportunity
to observe erosive effect of wind or min or
frost 1
A. To some extent, yes.
A.

r.l'he effects of wind, rain and erosion, of
course, on various 'slopes are all variable,
depending upon the type of material, the
ground, the rainfall, the rate that it fallsthere are so many variables in there, and
it varies in different localities; \Vit'h different
types of soil<s.
Q. Considering the type of the soil, and the
nature of diggings at the Walker gravel pit,
what it your opinion as to the effect of wind,
rain, frost, snow, moisture - on a 1¥2 to 1
slope?
A. I don't think, from all of the appe,arances in
the vincinity, I don't think there should be
very much weathering, a minor amount,
Nmt engineering could not take of. In ca1se of
cloudbursts or such things as that a llh to 1
-a 3 to 1 will wash it as easily as a 11;2 to 1."
(TI-765, 7GG, 767).
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L. R. Dunkley, project engineer m charge of construction of the Deer Creel;: Aqueduct (H-738-739), was
an important witness for the defendant. The Deer Creek
Aqueduct is cons,tructed through tlw \Y alker land ( R739). Mr. Dunkley was personally in dw.rge of this work
and \Vas intimately acquainted with the location of the
Salt Lake City Big Cottonwood Conduit with relation
to the Deer Creek Aqueduct (R-740). He had Leen on
the ·walker property on numerous occasions (H-7c10).
Defendant's Exhibits 42 and 4:3, (H-H8, 730, 731), are
maps of tJhe loca:tion of the Salt Lake City or Deer Creek
Aqueduct on the VI alker property and on ]n·opcrty immediately adjoining it on the north. 'l'lwse exhibits were
properly identified by Mr. Dunkley (l~-747-749). On
defendant's Exhibit 43 are eight cross sections of the
aqneduct which show the Salt Lake CiLy conduit "<;cming
around the hill." (11-750). ~lr. DunUey said:
":,, "' ~· and by the way, thai is the only point
in the \Valker property where the Salt Lake aqueduct interferes with the present natnrul grottml
slope, in mder t:o do \vhat we felt would pro:cct
the Salt Lake City conduit, above it-it is shown
on this little sketch in the upper left-hand corner
(referring to defendant's Exhibit 4i)). ·~ "' 'flw
eritic,al area, as far as our Salt Lake aqueduct is
concerned. * " ·~ On the \Valker property." (H749-750).

l\fr. Dunkley was asked:
H Q.
\Vhn.t in your opnnon as an cnginct'r, 1s a
slope tlwt would Lc adequate tu afrod ~'

reasonable degree of safety to the Salt Lake
conduit where it crO'sses that part of the
Walker workings where active operations
are being conducted~

• • •

A.
Later he

'.rhe materials being the same as they are
here, I would say a 1~'2 to 1, to a 2 to 1 sl;· e"
(TI-753, 754).
sta~e:l:

"Q.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

0 n a1 ] unlsue-J
.
S10}~E>S on ~,.e ,__, "c
c
~
duc1t, and numerous canal jobs the s~ope o,
1¥2 to 1, or flatter, is usually used. In certain
materials south of Sandy, and in the vicinity
o£ Draper, we had to use flatter slopes than
we are using here, on account of the materials
we encountered in this particular area, in
order to afford lateral support for the Salt
Lake City conduit, we are back filling this
excavated area, back to the natural ground
slope; and in that area that slope is approximately llh to 1.
And you consider that safe 7
rJ'hat is as safe as you can make it because
that is the natural slope that existed there
before we started our construction ·work.
As a ma:tter of fact, some of that natural slope
there is below 11;2 to 1, isn't it~
There are a few isolated cases where a
steeper slope from the Salt Lake City conduit,
than 1¥2 to 1, does exist.
The original ground line i's riding on 1¥2 to 1,
isn't it?
In this particular area, yes.
Vvhen yon back filled, yon filled up that declivity as indicated in Defendant's Exhibit 3.
You have it back to a 1¥2 to 1 slope 7
That is right.
L.

L ••••

And you reg-ard that as adequate for the protection of the Sa:lt Lrake Citv cronduit 7
A. All we are trying to do is to ~eplace the part
that we had to tempor,arily cut ·out, to construct our pipe line." (R-758-75~)).
Q.

Mr. J. B. Walker, who testified that he had had years
of experience in construction work and rparticularly in
handling soil and earth (R-768), was asked if a lVz to 1
slope properly dre,ssed would produce a 'safe slope for
the Sah Lake City conduit. He answered:
''It would be more than adequate. A 1.25 and
1.3 slope will produce all the stability and al'l of
the protection that yon can get out ·of thrat materia;! in place, and anything above tlmt is merely
providing an additional margin, with nothing to
be gained, as far as prope'r protecrtion is croncerned.'' ( R-863).
Defendant particu}arly requests the Supreme Court
to examine Defendant '·s Exhibits 3, 42 and 43, in the 'light
of l\Ir. Dunkley's testimony. It will there be seen that
not farther disrtant than 600 feet from the defendant's
a(?,tive opemtions, the Deer Oreek Aqueduct has been
cO'Il:structed at the "critical point" de'scribed by Mr.
Dunkley. The aqueduct comes into such close proximity
with the conduirt that the engineers of the Redamation
Service gave special 'coTisidera.tion to the question of
latera;l support for the conduit. Judicial notice may be
taken of the notorious :Da:c:t that the plajntiff corporation
is direcHy interested in the Deer Creek Aqueduct, and
that it is being built to 'Supply water for the plaintiff city.
\Ve have here presented a spectacular contrast. Insofar
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a1s defendant and intervenor are concerned in their respective activities, the plaintiff insists that a slope of 2
to 1 or even flatter, is necessary to afford its conduit
adequate support and to insure its safety. N otwithstanding this fact, a little more than 600 feet distant, the plaintiff does not quarrel with another branch of its government when that hranch plows down a hillside below its
CJonduit to install another water aquedect In this s 'hCl''e
a 'slope 'Of 11/z to 1 is adequate to tprotect the conduit. It
is very difficult to understand this distinction. Evidently
in dealing with third persons, such as the defendan~ an~
intervenor, the plaintiff demands that they meet a mo1·e
rigid and higher standard of conduct than the city practices itself. In this connection it is interesting to note the
following excerpt from the record during 1Ir. Dunkley''s
examination:
"Q. (By Mr. Riter) Now, 1\ir. Dunkley, will you
indicate to trhe court and describe to the court
the conditions ~on the ground in this criticra1
area., with the resultant delineations upon
1botth of these exl1ibits 1
MR. CHRIST'EN~SEN: \Ve object to t·hat a:s
wholly immaterial to any issue in this case. It is
not in tlle area in question. It does not make any
difference how dangerous ror how safe that may
be." (R-7Gl).
In order to offset this damaging evidence the plaintiff on eros's examination asked Mr. Dun1dey:
"Q. Is it your purpose, when you fina:lly finish
this off, to refill ·over your aqueduct, with
material, to estahl.ish the same slope it had
before that was cut out~"

Mr. Dunkley answered in the affirmative. (R-760).
He further testified tha:t the soil would he compacted
"with equipment" (R-760), and it was the desire not to
disturb any natural vegetation if it c1o'lud he avoided. (RI

760). He stated it would be between 50 and 60 feet from
the top of the aqueduct 'cut and filled to the Salt Lake
City aqueduct (R-761). N~otwithstanding this attempt
to mitigate the effect of Mr. Dunkley's te'stimony, and
exhibits, the eold hard fact remains that the slope below
the conduit and extending to the aqueduct, is a 1% to 1
s}ope~a 's:lope recognized a.s standard by the Reclamation
Service and as expressed by Mr. Dunkley, an adequate
slo1pe of 'safety. The defendant asks this pertinent question: Why is a slope of 1112 to 1 a slope of safety for the
conduit when the Deer Creek Aqueduct is concerned, but
is a. fearful threat to the safety of the conduit when the
defenda1nt and intervenor are concerned?
While there obviously existrs in the record a direct
conflict of testimony which was the duty of a trial court
to resolve, it is t[le earnest and sincere belief of the defendant that the evidence presented by it, supporting its
contention that a slope of safety for the conduit ~s llh
to 1 or less, so far preponderates that the court's finding
of a 2 to 1 slope is not supported by the evidence. Here
is one of these peculiar cases of rare o(!currence where
the ,conduct of the witnesses and their demeanor on the
stand is of minor ~significance in resolving a conflict in
evidence. AH witnesses in this case are men of rectitude
and honor, and the expert's in their exhaustive study of
ll(j

the situation and in giving their evidence manifestly only
desired to elucidate the truth as they saw and understood
it. When one reads the cold record of trial he must
reach the conclusion that defendant's evidence in respect
to the slopes of safety clearly preponderates.
Article VIII, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution provides:
"In equity casers the arppeal may he on questions of both law and fac.t; in eases a.t law the appeal shall be on questions of law alone."
The Supreme Court of Utah in discussing this tprovision of the State Constitution, 'said:
"Under this provision, it will he observed,
an appeal may be taken in equity cases on questions of fact as weU as of law. The appellate court,
·therefore, by necessary intendment and implication, ha's trhe same jurisdiction and power in equity
cases to determine questions of fact as of law,
and may go behind the findings and decree of the
trial court, consider all the evidence, decide on
which side the preponderance thereof is, ascertain
whetheT or nO't the proof justifies the findings and
decree, and enter or direct such findings and
decree to be entered as the evidence, in the judgment of the appellate tribunal, may justify."

(Whittaker v. Ferguson, 16 Utah 240,51 Pac.
980.)

This rule has been affirmed innumerable times. In Tripp
v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 Pac. 913, 917, is writt.en:
''Counsel have regarded this proceeding as a
suit in equity, and we so consider it. In such case
it becomes our duty to review questions of both
the law and the facts.''
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The c'onclusion must be that slopes of 1% to 1 commencing at the edge of a. berm of 15 £eet in width on the
westerly side of the conduit, will afford the conduit
reasonable support and insure it's safety for an indefinite
time to come, and the Supreme Court should so find.

CONCLUSION
This i's an equity cause in whic:h the Supreme Court
may reach its uwn conclusions as to the fact's, and may
enter a judgment consistent with its decision.

(Mellon v. Vondor-Horst Brothers, 44 Uurn
300; 144 Pac. 130, 136.)
The Supreme Court ha1s stated:

"* * * we are satisfied from the fads shown
that the appellants are entitled to the use of more
water than is awarded them in the decree of the
court below, and that the deeree of the court below, as well as the findings of facts, ·should be
modified and made more certain, so as to settle
the whole controversy between the parties,-settle
it so that it may be ascertained with reasonable
certainty how much the court has decreed in favor
of either party without a re::;ort to further proceedings. This should be done upon the proofs
taken in the case without the necessity of awarding a. new trial. * * * This case is remanded, with
directions to the court below to modify the deeree
and findings so as to conf·orm to this opinion.''
(Salina Creek Irrigation Co. v. Salina Stock
Company, 7 Utah 456; 27 Pac. 578, 579;
Affirm. 163 U.S. 109, 41 L. Ed. 90, 16 S.
Ct. 1036.)
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The following quotation is also pertinent to the action which in the opinion of the defendant should be
taken by the Supreme Court in this case:
'' (4) In the case of Baker v. Hatch, Sheriff,
et al., 70 Utah 1, 257 P. 673, this court held that
in equity cases the primary duty to make findings
of bet upon the issues rests upon the shoulders
of the trial court, and that it:s failure to make a
finding upon a material issue 1s reversible error
(see also Pike v. Clark et al., 95 U ta!h 235, 79 P.
2d 1010), but that where the evidence is not in conflict or greatly preponderate's one way or the
other, this court not infrequently makes its own
finding's of fact--that under Section 6995, C.L.
1917, Sec. 104-41-23, U.C.A. 1943, it has the right
to make its own findings of fact. Furthermore, it
may affirm tho lower court's action and return the
case with directions to make findings upon the
material iS'snos. Daird v. Upper Canal Irr. Co., 70
Utah 57,257 P. 1060."
(Dahl v. Cayias, 110 Utah 398; 174 Pac. (2d)
430.)
Defendant respectfully submHs tha:t the findings of
facts and judgment in thi's action should be modified in
such degree and manner as will be consistent with its
contentions herein made, and that the cause he remanded
to the trial .court with directions: ('a) to modify and
amend the findings of fact and judgment consistent wit-h
the decision of the Supreme Court, herein; (b) to cause
cross section surveys of defendant's land below plaintiff's conduit to be made at such frequent intervals a:s
the trial court may deem advisable und to pre·serve the
field notes and records of such survey in the records of

thi's cause; (e) to determine the width of plaintiff's right
of way easement across Section 25 aforesaid; (d) to
cause survey '0£ the center line of plaintiff's conduit to
be made and marked upon the ground and the field notes
and records of said survey to be preserved in the records
of this cause; (e) to cause a survey of plaintiff's right
of way e~asement a!Cross Section 24 and 25 to be made
after the court has determined the width of said easemen:t across Se,ction 2'5 and to order that the said right
of way be marked upon the ground, and the field note~
and records of said ~survey be preserved in the re-cords
of this cause.
Respectfully submitted,

FRANKLIN RITER,
FR,ED L. F'INLINSON,
Attorneys for Defend!wnt awd
Appellant.
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